This article is based on the despatch that appeared in the “London Gazette” of 31 May 1916, written by Brigadier-General Charles Macpherson Dobell KCB.
War Office,
31st May, 1916.
The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Major-General Sir Charles M. Dobell, K.C.B., Commanding the Allied Forces in the Cameroons:—
General Headquarters, Cameroons,
1st March, 1916.
My Lord,
I have the honour to forward herewith a summary of the operations carried out by the Allied force under my command, covering the period between the capitulation of Duala, 27th September, 1914, and the termination of active operations. I have, in this despatch, endeavoured to maintain a correct perspective, remembering that our operations in this theatre of war are incomparable in magnitude to those taking place elsewhere. For purposes of comparison I may, however, add that the number of troops of both nations at my immediate disposal at the commencement of the campaign amounted to 4,300 West African native soldiers; on the 21st November, 1915, this number had been increased to 9,700, including Indian troops. In these numbers the British and French forces were approximately equal.
As Your Lordship is aware, I have kept the proper authorities informed in some detail as to the proceedings and progress of the troops under my command. These despatches I have endeavoured to forward at intervals of about a fortnight; I do not, therefore, propose to enlarge on such questions as the organization and preparation of the force placed at my disposal, nor the naval measures that were taken in a campaign to which the adjective
” amphibious ” may be applied in its widest sense. It is perhaps sufficient to state I fully realized, that the conquest of a country which is some 306,000 square miles in area, or roughly one and a half times the size of the German Empire, defended by a well-led and well-trained native force, plentifully supplied with machine guns, was no light task.
Events of 1914*
*please note that I have placed these headings for benefit of navigation of this page. I have also highlighted dates and inserted bullet points in places for the same purpose. They are not part of Dobell’s despatch.
On my passage from the United Kingdom early in September 1914, I learnt at various ports of call that the operations which had taken place on the Nigerian frontier had not been as successful as had been anticipated,
thus confirming my opinion that Duala, the capital and chief port of the Cameroons, must be made my immediate objective. I entertained no doubts as to the ability of the Royal Navy to overcome the difficulties and make a landing at Duala feasible, and my best hopes were realised when I was informed that H.M.S. “Challenger” could force a passage through the sunken wrecks and other obstructions in the Cameroon River, and reach a point 7,000 yards from the town. This was made possible owing to the mine sweeping and other
preparatory work which had been carried out by the Royal Navy and Nigeria Marine, under the direction of Captain Fuller, R.N., H.M.S. “Cumberland.”
On my summons for the surrender of the Colony being refused, and after duly notifying the German Commandant of my intention, I ordered a bombardment of the town to commence early on 26th September; this in combination with a land demonstration, made by way of one of the neighbouring creeks, was sufficient to induce the Commandant, on 27th September, to surrender the towns of Duala and Bonaberi, with a small strip of land in their environs. The surrender of Duala secured us a safe and convenient base for the future absorption of German territory; further, the capture of stores, supplies, field guns, and the removal of over 400 German Europeans was a great loss to the German Field Force, whilst the seizure of the large amount of shipping and numerous small craft in the harbour, was an inestimable advantage to us.
My first object was to consolidate the position already won, and with this object in view an Allied force was allotted the task of clearing the country up to and including the Japoma Bridge, Midland Railway, whilst a
British force commenced to make headway towards Maka on the Northern Railway line. Reconnaissances by land and water were carried out with uniformly successful results.
I may remark incidentally that neither the climate nor the character of the country favoured the offensive, officers and men were exposed to the most trying conditions – incessant tropical rains, absence of roads or even
paths, a country covered with the densest African forest – all contributed to the difficulties with which the troops were faced. Had it not been for the existing railways which formed a line of advance as well as supply, it is
difficult to see how progress could have been made. The country in the immediate vicinity of Duala is perhaps typical of the greater portion of the Cameroons in which my troops have operated, excepting beyond Northern railhead there the country becomes open and, on account of its greater altitude, healthier, but all the coast line, and for some 150 miles inland, one meets the same monotonous impenetrable African forest fringed, on the coast line, by an area of mangrove swamp in varying depth. The zone is well watered by numerous rivers of
which the Wuri, Sanaga and Njong present serious military obstacles. Once outside this belt conditions change at once, supplies and live stock are obtainable, and open grass lands are reached; the one unusual geographical
feature is the Cameroon Mountain, some 13,000 feet high, which rises abruptly from the sea, its slopes clothed with valuable plantations, and on which the hill station of Buea, the former administrative capital of the Protectorate, is perched.
By the first week in October we had made good the country as far as Maka and the left bank of the Dibamba creek. The Japoma railway bridge, 900 yards in length, was broken in two places, but a fine feat was performed bu the French tirailleurs in forcing this passage under a galling rifle and machine-gun fire. The Royal Navy and Royal Marine Light Infantry also materially contributed to this success.
I now judged that I could move a force by the Wuri River on Jabassi, so as to secure Duala from any attack from the north-east; a mixed Naval and Military force, supported by armed craft, was organized and an attack was delivered on 8th October. It is regrettable that this operation was not at first successful, difficult country, novel conditions, and the fact that our native troops encountered machine-gun fire for the first time are contributory causes to failure, nevertheless it became necessary completely to reorganize the force and repeat the operation, with the result that Jabassi was taken on 14th October. From this place a force was pushed out to Njamtan and the country around Jabassi was cleared of the enemy.
My next objective was Edea, on which place I determined an advance should be made from three directions, two by land and one by river. Strong forces were moved from Japoma and by the Njong River to Dehane, thence by a track towards Edea. The third force proceeded by the Sanaga River; the navigation of this river
is most difficult, dangerous bars hinder entrance into its mouth and sand banks obstruct the passage up to Edea. The feat performed by Commander L. W. Braithwaite, R.N., in navigating an armed flotilla on the Sanaga was a remarkable one. Thus the combined movement, outlined above, was entirely successful and Edea was occupied on the morning of 26th October. This result had not been achieved without hard fighting, particularly on the part of the force operating by the line of the railway.
It was during the preliminary operations in this undertaking that Lieutenant Child, Director of Nigeria Marine, Commander Gray, and Captain Franqueville, of the French Army, lost their lives through the capsizing of their
boat in the surf at the mouth of the Njong River – valuable lives whose losses it was difficult to replace.
During the latter half of October the small force under Lieut.-Colonel Haywood was continuously engaged with the enemy on the line of the Northern Railway, but had made such good progress that I was in a position to arrange for an attack on Victoria, Soppo, and Buea. As in previous operations I divided my force, part of which was moved by water to Tiko, part from Susa by Mpundu on the Mungo River, and the third portion supplied by the Royal Navy and Royal Marine Light Infantry moved by sea to Victoria. The opposition met with cannot be described as serious, but the country was very trying to troops; the energy with which our advantage was pushed appeared to demoralise the Germans, and by the 15th November we had secured Buea, with Soppo
and Victoria. We inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy whilst, escaping very lightly ourselves. With the double object of striking an effective blow at the enemy and at the same time relieving the pressure on the southern frontier of Nigeria I decided to clear the whole of the Northern Railway of the enemy, and for this
purpose concentrated a force at Mujuka, under command of Colonel Gorges, on 30th November. This force gradually fought its way to the North and reached Nkongsamba (railhead) which was surrendered to us on 10th December. It is worthy of remark that we took two airplanes at this place – the first machines that had ever arrived in West Africa.
Events of first half of 1915
The advance was continued to Dschang, which was occupied on 3rd January, and the fort destroyed; most of the hostile resistance was met with at the Nkam River, but our columns rarely remained unmolested and experienced difficulties in operating in a class of country totally different to that to which they had by then become accustomed. I decided, as soon as the fort at Dschang had been destroyed, that the place
should be evacuated and Nkongsamba, with its outpost at Bare, should be our most advanced position. It was unfortunate that we could not continue to hold Dschang, as our withdrawal gave a false impression to the natives and emboldened the enemy. However, with the troops at my disposal I did not feel strong enough to maintain and supply a post, 55 miles north of railhead, in a difficult and mountainous country.
Early in 1915 the situation was as follows:
- British troops holding Duala, the Northern Railway with Bare, Victoria and Dibombe (a defended post south-west of Jabassi).
- French troops on the line of the Midland Railway up to and including Edea, which place was partially isolated as one span of the first of the two bridges had been destroyed.
- A detachment at Kribi was protecting that seaport from land attack.
- Ships and armed craft of the Allied Navies had visited the whole of the Cameroons sea board and had established bases for small craft to patrol the rivers where navigable.
By this time approximately 1,000 male Europeans, only 32 of whom were incapable of bearing arms, had been deported for internment in Europe. Towards the end of 1914 the French, under General Aymerich, and Belgian troops based on French Equatorial Africa, commenced to make their presence felt in the South and South-East, but my force was separated from them by a distance of approximately 400 miles.
In the North an Allied force was fully occupied in observing Mora and Garua. At and near Ossidinge a small British force from Nigeria and German forces were in contact. Notwithstanding the number of troops, British, French and Belgian, in the country it was impossible at this period to co-ordinate their movements, owing to the vastness of the area over which they were scattered and the impossibility of establishing any means of intercommunication between the various Commanders. Furthermore, it was difficult for me to pursue a very active policy, as it was necessary to maintain comparatively strong garrisons in the places already occupied. Posts on our lines of communication were also absorbing troops from my somewhat depleted force, amongst which sickness was beginning to play its part.
It was on the 5th January that the German Commander endeavoured to deliver a serious blow to the French force commanded by Colonel Mayer. Two practically simultaneous attacks were made against his force; the first at Kopongo, on the railway, the second at Edea. I had obtained some knowledge of the German Commander’s intention and the post at Kopongo had been slightly augmented, with the happy result that the attack on this point was easily repulsed, but not until the railway and telegraph lines had both been cut and all communication with Edea severed. The troops at Edea had, however, to bear the brunt of a more serious movement. The locality of Edea is by no means easy to defend owing to the proximity of the forest, the scattered nature of the buildings, and inequality of the ground; but so skilfully were the defences devised, and so good was the French marksmanship, that at the termination of the combat the Germans left on the field
23 Europeans dead and 190 native soldiers killed and wounded. The French loss consisted of 1 European serjeant and 3 tirailleurs killed and 11 tirailleurs wounded. A machine gun, number of rifles, ammunition and equipment fell into the French hands. It is significant that this was the first and last occasion on which the Germans attempted an operation of this nature on a comparatively large scale.
Towards the end of January, Lieut.-Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Cunliffe arrived at Duala on a mission from Lagos, and as a result of a conference it was agreed that a more active prosecution of the campaign in the Northern Cameroons should be undertaken. I detached Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) W. D. Wright, V.C., a most able officer, from the Staff of the British Contingent under my command and placed his services at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Allied Forces at Garua. I also arranged with Captain Fuller, R.N., for the despatch of a naval field gun to Yola, via the Niger and Benue Rivers, for eventual use against the forts at Garua.
The early days of February were marked by great hostile activity in the neighbourhood of Northern railhead. Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn, commanding a battalion of the Nigeria Regiment, had a serious encounter with the enemy at Mbureku on the morning of the 3rd February resulting in the capture of the hostile camp, a large quantity of small-arm ammunition, and equipment. We were, however, unable to reap the full advantage of our success as Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn was obliged to transfer his force to the neighbourhood of Harmann’s Farm, where the Sierra Leone Battalion was engaged with the enemy. During these two incidents we lost nearly 120 native soldiers killed, wounded or missing; but, after we had consolidated our position at Bare, the enemy did not follow up the slight advantage he had gained.
Constant activity during February had failed to gain for us any material advantage to the north of the railway, and there were a series of small incidents which culminated in the second attack by our troops on the points
known as Stoebel’s and Harmann’s Farms on 4th March. I regret that! this attack was not successful and we lost some valuable lives, including Major (Lieut.-Colonel) G. P. Newstead, commanding the Sierra Leone Battalion, and Captain C. H. Dinnen, Staff Captain, an officer of great promise. The enemy must, however, have suffered in a similar degree, an it was later found that he had evacuated his defensive position and retired further north.
Lt-Col. George Pope Newstead is buried in Douala Cemetery.
During February I received valuable reinforcements from French and British West African Colonies, and I was enabled to reconstitute my force and place a more homogeneous unit at the disposal of Lieut.-Colonel R. A. de B. Rose, commanding the Gold Coast Regiment.
On the 12th March a mission from French Equatorial Africa, at the head of which was Monsieur Fourneau, Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Moyen Congo, reached Duala. Its object was to invite my co-operation in an immediate advance, in conjunction with the troops under General Aymerich from south-east and east, against Jaunde [now, Yaoundé, the capital of present-day Cameroon]. Since the occupation of Duala Jaunde had been transformed into the temporary seat of the Colonial Administration. I fully realised the political and strategic importance of Jaunde, but demurred embarking on such an operation at that moment. It was late in the season and the rains were already beginning, besides which the troops I was able to employ were insufficient to ensure success in the absence of effective cooperation, in the immediate vicinity of Jaunde, by the troops under General Aymerich. Owing to the difficulty of communication it was quite unsafe to count on this. However, in view of the great advantage which would follow an early occupation of Jaunde, I consented to cooperate with all my available strength, and the 20th April was fixed as the date on which an advance should be made from the line Ngwe-So Dibanga, on the Kele River. I consequently entrained a British force, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Haywood, on 7th April, which was to commence a methodical advance in co-operation with the French troops under Colonel Mayer. The forcing of the line of the Kele River and the position at Ngwe, both of which places were obstinately defended, occasioned my troops some losses. I further found it necessary to despatch a force to Sakbajeme to deny the crossing of the Sanaga River at that place to the enemy. It soon became evident
that the enemy was withdrawing troops from other and more distant parts of the Colony to resist our further advance.
At midnight 23rd/24th April the blockade of the Cameroons was declared, and every artifice was used to deceive the enemy, and incessant and unremitting activity was maintained by the Royal Navy on the coast line, so as to induce the enemy to believe that disembarkation would be made at a point from which a force could be marched on Jaunde. Campo had been occupied by a Naval detachment, and a boat patrol of the river as far as Dipikar was maintained. The advance from the line already mentioned was subsequently postponed till 1st May, on which date the French and British columns moved forward to make good Eseka and Wum
Biagas respectively. The French advance on Eseka was conducted with some difficulty, as broken bridges denied
them the use of the railway line for supply trains. Commandant Mechet, who conducted the advance, successfully overcame all difficulties and, after being seriously opposed at Sende, reached Eseka on 11th May.
Turning to the British advance, on 1st May Lieut.-Colonel Haywood recommenced his march eastwards from Ngwe, and driving in the hostile outposts at Ndupe, on the 3rd May his force was facing the formidable position
which the enemy had established on the left bank of the Mbila River at Wum Biagas. We captured the position on 4th May, but not without serious losses in European officers. A warm tribute is due to the bravery and steadiness displayed by our Native troops, and to the pluck and endurance of the European ranks in face of such stubborn resistance.
As previously arranged, the French force at Eseka now moved north and joined the British at Wum Biagas, and Colonel Mayer left Edea to assume command of the Allied expedition. Stores and supplies were pushed forward by road, and a naval 12-pounder gun was despatched to reinforce our artillery. Owing to the heavy casualties which had occurred in the ranks of the two battalions of the Nigeria Regiment and the inability of Nigeria, owing to the many calls made by General Cunliffe’s troops, to supply me with trained soldiers, I decided towards the end of May to establish a training depot at Duala. The recruits were enlisted in Nigeria, and transferred to Duala for training. This proved a great success, and by its means 536 soldiers were trained and passed into the ranks.
On 11th May I received a message from the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, which informed me that the progress of the troops under General Aymerich had not been as rapid as expected, and that as neither
Dume or Lomie had been captured, no definite date could be given for the advance from those places. As I realised that the advance on Jaunde, if delayed for any length of time, would be seriously interfered with by the
rains, and the sickness among both Europeans and natives, which was already causing me some anxiety would rapidly increase, I instructed Colonel Mayer to push on with all vigour, in consequence of which he left Wum
Biagas on 25th May. I regret that supply difficulties soon made themselves evident, the country was barren,
and with all available carriers and the few motor vehicles at my disposal, at that time only three, I was unable to transport food for Europeans and natives with sufficient rapidity. Handicapped by the almost impenetrable bush
and a terrain which afforded many defensive positions, the advance became exceedingly slow. At every turn of the road the advance was met by machine-gun fire, so that during the 25th and 26th May only 5 miles was made good. It took two days to force the enemy from Njok. The enemy evidently had received reinforcements and commenced to interfere with our line of communication, which was peculiarly susceptible to attack, while the long convoys of carriers were singularly prone to panic. I received an appeal from Colonel Mayer for reinforcements, as in addition to other disabilities dysentery had broken out in his force. I sent forward such troops as were available and took measures to obtain more carriers from the West African Colonies.
From 31st May till 4th June Colonel Mayer was held up at a position at Matem, which presented more than usual difficulties owing to the swamps, which rendered a turning movement impossible. By the 5th June only 12 miles from Wum Biagas had been made good. About this date Colonel Mayer informed me that owing to sickness, especially amongst Europeans, and to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, he was of opinion that the further advance of his column on Jaunde was impracticable, and he proposed, pending further instructions, to establish himself on the Puge River, where he could await the approach of General Aymerich’s troops. I immediately informed the Governor-General of Equatorial Africa of the situation, adding that unless he had recent news of General Aymerich’s advance I should be obliged to withdraw Colonel Mayer’s force to the line of the Kele River.
On 7th June Governor-General Merlin informed me by telegraph that he had received no further news from the Southern Cameroons. I thereupon decided to withdraw our force to the Ndupe River preparatory to holding a line So Dibanga – Ngwe. A serious attack on one of our convoys of 500 carriers, and the consequent loss of food supplies, decided Colonel Mayer to retire without further delay. During the 16th and 17th June our rearguards were harassed, but never broken, and the enemy suffered considerably in his attacks. I deemed
it advisable to send forward a reinforcement of the last troops at my disposal, so that the pressure on our withdrawal could be relieved; these troops, after leaving Duala on the morning of the 15th June, bivouacked the following day at Ngui, 35 miles beyond Edea, having completed much of the distance in heavy tropical rains.
On the following morning, after resuming their march, they reached Colonel Mayer’s column at a most opportune moment during a heavy attack on the rearguard. Not till 28th June did the hostile activity cease, when our posts were firmly established at Ngwe and on the Kele River at So Dibanga. In comparison to
the size of our force the casualties were serious, 25 per cent, being either killed or wounded. I regret that this operation was not more fruitful in results, and I fully recognise the fact that Colonel Mayer was not in a position to undertake, singlehanded, an advance on Jaunde, but I had hoped that the pressure that was being brought on the hostile forces in the Southern Cameroons would have had the effect of preventing a concentration against us. During this period our troops near Northern Railhead were not in a position to undertake any serious offensive action.
Events of second half of 1915
There was now an unavoidable lull in the operations caused by the rains. I seized this opportunity to send as many British officers and non-commissioned officers as possible to the United Kingdom for a few weeks’ rest, and I arranged that most of the native troops from Nigeria and the Gold Coast should, in turn, visit their own Colonies. I managed, however, to send detachments to operate near the Njong and Campo Rivers respectively. A French detachment from Ngwe also carried out a successful reconnaissance in July.
It was on 25th and 26th August, 1915, at a conference which took place at Duala between Governor-General Merlin, General Aymerich, and myself, that the plan was decided on by which the Cameroons was eventually conquered. The fall of Garua, in the north, early in June enabled a British and French force to be set free which could move through the highlands of the Cameroons to the south. General Aymerich, whose troops were now established at Bertua and Dume, promised definite co-operation, with Jaunde, as before, the objective, whilst a force under Lieut.-Colonel le Meillour moved parallel to the eastern frontier of Muni, and was to cross the
Campo River and move in the direction of Ebolowa. It was also arranged that I should show such activity as was possible from Northern Railhead so as to assist the British force at Ossidinge in its attempt to link up with
other troops from Nigeria, and further that a force should land at Campo and move parallel to the northern frontier of Spanish Guinea. It was unfortunate that Brigadier-General Cunliffe was unable to attend this conference, but all details were communicated to him, and he was asked to exercise all possible pressure
from the north. His role was most admirably carried out.
The arrival of the 5th Light Infantry of the Indian Army strengthened my command, and further reinforcements from French West Africa were promised. The General Officer Commanding at Freetown and the Governors
of Nigeria and the Gold Coast agreed to send me the carriers I required and to maintain them by monthly drafts. It was thanks to these officers that, in spite of a rather heavy sick roll among carriers, an efficient transport service was maintained throughout. My requirements in motor transport were also met; this service proved invaluable and far exceeded my expectations. Thus by 22nd September preparations were sufficiently far advanced for a move to be made in an easterly direction.
Many of the earlier operations were a repetition of those which had taken place in May and June, but the general plan differed in so much that I arranged for the British and French lines of supply to be kept distinct, whilst I also determined that Eseka should be made the French advanced base from which operations could be carried forward to the Jaunde – Kribi road, and that our general advance should be carried out by means of parallel columns by road and railway. Our communications needed much repair, including the total reconstruction of a heavy railway bridge and a deviation necessitating considerable labour on earthwork. Many other smaller bridges were broken or destroyed, those on the road were made fit for heavy traffic, those on the railway were practically rebuilt.
The British force, as previously, experienced stiff resistance at Wum Biagas, but on 9th October that place was captured after a lively action, in which the Nigerian and Gold Coast troops once more distinguished themselves.
From here we were enabled to send out flanking columns and render some assistance to the French troops who were fighting their way to Eseka. The Kele River, in flood, proved a formidable obstacle, and its crossing somewhat delayed the British flanking columns sent out from Wum Biagas. Sende was occupied by the French on 25th October, and the enemy was driven from Eseka on 30th October. Considerable rolling stock, left behind after our previous advance, was retaken, and proved a valuable addition to our exiguous supply of engines and wagons. By 23rd November, both British and French forces were ready for the final advance, the bush track from Edea to Wum Biagas had been converted into a good motor road, and through railway communication, Duala -Eseka, was nearing completion. There were also over 7,000 carriers employed on such sections of the communications as were still unfit for motor or rail traffic. Dschang Mangas was selected as the primary objective of the British force, whilst the French were directed to make good the line of the Jaunde – Kribi road. Both forces slightly modified their tactics and the advance was generally carried out by a main body, with two wings moving on as wide a front as the nature of the country permitted. The method of our advance appears to have entirely disconcerted the enemy and, although he still continued strenuously to resist our advance, it became apparent that his strength was gradually becoming exhausted.
Towards the end of November the fighting in and around Lesogs by the troops under Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn was of a very severe nature, but the troops from the Northern Provinces of Nigeria gallantly rose to the occasion and, despite all difficulties of the country, were not to be denied in their endeavour to dislodge the
enemy. Much credit is due to these troops and their leaders for the admirable conduct of this operation. Ngung was reached on the 30th November, and, up to this place, every defensive position was disputed by the enemy.
On 7th December the advance on Dschang Mangas was continued and both main and flank columns were subject to opposition. A well executed move by a small force of the Gold Coast Regiment, under Captain Butler, V.C., considerably disturbed the enemy, the capture of one of his machine guns and several thousand rounds of ammunition, in addition to important documents, produced considerable effect. On 17th December the more open and cultivated country was reached and we took Dschang Mangas.
From 26th November onwards the French were fighting their way through very broken country to Mangeles; they had to face determined opposition and lost a considerable number of European and native soldiers, but their tenacity of purpose was rewarded by the capture of Mangeles on 21st December, after intermittent fighting covering a period of five days. The column halted at this place for rest and to
establish a supply depot.
I must now indicate the turn that events had taken beyond Northern Railhead. I was informed from Nigeria that the British force at Ossidinge, under Major Crookenden, would be prepared to move on Bamenda on 12th October. I therefore ordered a force consisting of portions of the West African Regiment, 5th Light Infantry, and some artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Cotton, 5th Light Infantry, to move on Dschang from Bare, also starting on
12th October. Hostile opposition was experienced at Mwu and Nkam Rivers and from an entrenched position at Sanschu. On 6th November Dschang was occupied. On receipt of information that Major Crookenden’s force
had reached Bamenda on 22nd October I ordered Lieut.-Colonel Cotton to leave a garrison in Dschang and move a force to Bagam to co-operate with Major Crookenden in an attack on that place. The enemy had, however, forestalled us and withdrawn to Fumban, whither we pursued him after experiencing some difficulty in effecting the crossing of the Nun River. On 2nd December the important centre of Fumban was occupied and an abortive effort of the enemy to retake it was frustrated. Brigadier-General Cunliffe, foreseeing the possibility of obstinate resistance at Fumban, had directed two other small columns to co-operate in our movement on that place. These columns arrived almost simultaneously with that under Lieut.-Colonel Cotton. Major Crookenden’s troops then continued their advance under Brigadier-General Cunliffe’s direction, whilst I placed garrisons in Fumban, Bana and Bagam, and the bulk of Lieut.-Colonel Cotton’s troops returned to railhead. I was thus enabled to withdraw a small force to move from Nkongsamba to Jabassi and penetrate the Bafia country, where I still believed there were small hostile parties. I also was enabled to detach a force to assist the French column operating from Campo. I think I may consider our operations in the Northern area were entirely satisfactory, and the simultaneous advance of our columns took the heart out of the remnants of the enemy forces in that district. Furthermore, we had established touch with Brigadier-General Cunliffe’s columns, which were now converging on the Sanaga River, at a point known as the Nachtigal Rapids. Our losses were slight and the health of all ranks was considerably better than that of the troops fighting in the lower altitudes.
Reverting to the operations of the main forces. On receiving information that the British force had arrived at Dschang Mangas I decided that it would be more advantageous to move on Jaunde direct, rather than await
the French advance to the Jaunde – Kribi road. In arriving at this decision I was influenced by the fact that the mind of the native does not understand the meaning nor necessity of delay, and from a political point of view the early occupation of Jaunde appeared to be all important. From 22nd December, the hostile resistance gradually weakened, strongly entrenched positions were abandoned, and on the morning of the 1st January Colonel Gorges entered Jaunde with his force. The enemy appeared to have completely broken under the
pressure which he was now experiencing from all sides. Allied troops from the north, troops from French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo commenced to arrive in Jaunde during the first week in January. It is, I
think, a remarkable feat that troops that had fought and marched for a period of seventeen months should have converged on their objective within a few days of one another.
Events of 1916
The direct effect of the occupation of Jaunde was to relieve all pressure in front of the French force advancing from Mangeles, the Jaunde – Kribi road being reached early in January. British and French forces were moved during the first week in January to Widemenge and in the direction of Ebolowa; via Olama and Onana Besa crossings of the Njong River. At Kol Maka, Lieut.-Colonel Haywood succeeded in securing the release of
officers, non-commissioned officers, civilian and native non-combatants who had been taken prisoners by the Germans at various times during the war; his force, supported by a strong French column, continued its advance
on Ebolowa, on which place a second Allied column was also advancing. A French force under Lieut.-Colonel Faucon occupied Ebolowa on 19th January, after experiencing some slight resistance. The definite move of the
remnants of the German forces towards Spanish territory now became apparent, and Lieut.-Colonel Haywood proceeded with all despatch to follow them up as far as Nkan, from which place I diverted him via Efulen on
Kribi, in order to clear the western area of stragglers. A British force was also moved to Lolodorf. Colonel Morrison took command of a strong French force, and, moving towards the Spanish frontier, succeeded in driving the German force in front of him across the Campo river into neutral territory. A similar operation was
conducted by the French force which had operated from Campo, so that by the middle of February no Germans were left in the Cameroons, and the conquest of the country
had been completed.
Regiments and units participating in the campaign
The despatch continues with naming officers and men who had earned particular merit during these operations. This list of regiments and units is compiled by reference to Dobell’s list:
- Native Troops (Imperial)
- Sierra Leone Company, Royal Garrison Artillery
- 36th Company, Royal Engineers
- West India Regiment
- West African Regiment
- 5th Light Infantry (Indian Army)
- Native Troops (Colonial)
- West African Frontier Force
- Nigerian Regiment
- Gold Coast Regiment
- Sierra Leone Battalion
- Gambia Company
- West African Frontier Force
Research tips and links
This despatch in the “London Gazette”
“La conquête du Cameroun, 1er août 1914-20 février 1916” by général de division Aymérich
The process for researching officers and men of the British Army who served in Cameroon, either in headquarters or attached to the regiments listed above, is the same as for all others as described in How to research a soldier.
One day I may get around to presenting information on researching men of the “native troops” as listed above, but as you might guess this is all rather more complex and problematic.
