These despatches appeared in the “London Gazette” of 21 June 1916.
The first despatch is essentially about the period before and during the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal. See also Defeat of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, February 1915
DESPATCH No. I.
From Lieut.-General Sir J. G. Maxwell,
K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding the Force in Egypt.
Sir,
Army Headquarters, Cairo,
16th February, 1915.
I have the honour to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for War the accompanying report from Major-General A. Wilson, C.B., Commanding the Suez Canal Defences, who has conducted the operations to my complete satisfaction. He has been ably assisted by Brigadier-General A. H. Bingley, C.I.E. I fully endorse what General Wilson says of the conduct of the regimental officers and men, both British and Indian.
The French Hydroplane Squadron and the detachment Royal Flying Corps have rendered very valuable services. The former, equipped with hydroplanes with floats, ran great risks in undertaking land reconnaissance, whilst the latter were much handicapped by inferior types of machines. Notwithstanding these
drawbacks, they furnished me regularly with all information regarding the movements of the enemy.
I take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Secretary of State for War the great services rendered by the Count de Serionne and the officials of the Suez Canal Company; they have one and all been most helpful, and have unreservedly placed their own personal services and the entire resources of the Suez Canal Company at my disposal. The success of our defence was greatly assisted by their cordial co-operation.
Also Sir George Macauley, K.C.M.G., Major Blakeney and Captain Hall, of the Egyptian State Railways. In addition to building two excellent armoured trains, these officers worked most assiduously in organizing
and superintending the railway arrangements, both along the Canal and in the transportation of reinforcements from Cairo. No difficulties of any sort were made, and such difficulties as existed were speedily overcome, and I cannot sufficiently express my obligation to them.
Also Major Liddell, late Royal Engineers, Director of Telegraphs under the Egyptian Government. This official was largely responsible for the excellent system of intercommunication which prevailed throughout the Canal Defences.
It is needless for me to add that from Admiral Peirse and the ships of His Majesty’s Navy, as well as those of France under his command, most important and valuable assistance was received.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
J. G. MAXWELL, Lieut.-General,
Commanding the Force in Egypt.
Headquarters, Canal Defences, to the General Staff, Headquarters, Cairo.
Ismailia,
11th February, 1915.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report on the recent attack on the Suez Canal. In order to make the narrative complete, I will preface it with a brief account of what has taken place since I took over command of the Canal Defences.
I landed at Suez on the 16th November, 1914, and went to Ismailia the same day, having been preceded ten days before by Brigadier-General A. H. Bingley, my Chief Staff Officer, who was sent from India in advance of the troops to make preliminary arrangements for their landing and despatch to destination. I there took over command of the Canal Defences from Colonel W. G. Walker, Commanding 9th Indian Brigade [9th (Sirhind) Infantry Brigade], which had been detached from the 3rd (Lahore) Division for temporary duty in Egypt.
In accordance with the instructions received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the Canal Defences were organized in three sections, with headquarters at Suez, Ismailia Ferry, and Kantara, respectively, my own headquarters and the general reserve being placed at Ismailia, with the advanced base at Zagazig and base general hospital at Cairo. These arrangements were completed by the 5th December, 1914, when the last units of the force arrived from India.
Preparations for defence. The months of November, December and January were devoted to a systematic development of the naturally strong line of defence afforded by the Canal, thus completing the work which had
been initiated previous to my arrival. A number of defensive posts were prepared on the east bank, to cover the more important ferries and provide facilities for local counterattacks. Trenches were dug on the west bank to cover the intervals between posts and frustrate attempts at crossing. Communications were improved by the construction of landing stages and removable pontoon bridges for use at important. points. A flotilla of armed
launches, manned by the Royal Navy, was organized, for canal patrols. A complete system of telegraph, telephone, and wireless posts communication was installed, linking up all the posts with headquarters. A system of defence was established for the protection of the railway, the telegraph lines, and the sweet water canal. The detachment of the Royal Flying Corps was organized, staffed with observers, and equipped with accommodation for its planes.
General summary of events. The resources of the Suez Canal Company in tugs, launches, lighters, &c., were carefully examined, so as to utilise them for military purposes. Arrangements were made with the Railway Administration for the collecting of rolling stock at convenient places, in order to expedite the dispatch of reinforcements to threatened points. Provision was also made for the organization of the water supply of the troops and the formation of supply depots, as well as for the rapid collection and evacuation of the sick and wounded. A system of intelligence, censorship and police surveillance was established, and plans were devised, in consultation with the Canal Authorities, for the control of shipping in the event of an attack. Last, but not least, a scheme for making inundations, and so limiting the front over which the enemy could attack, was carried out successfully, by the Irrigation Department at Port Said and the engineering staff of the Canal Company at El Cap, Kantara and Ballah.
During this period no active operation took place, except a Bedouin raid made by the enemy in the direction of Kantara. A patrol of the Bikanir Camel Corps under Captain A. J. H. Chope, 2nd Gurkha Rifles, consisting of one Indian officer and twenty other ranks, encountered a force of some 200 Bedouins and Turks on the 20th November, 1914, near Bir-el-Nuss, and in spite of the enemy’s treacherous attack, due to the abuse of the white flag, extricated itself successfully from a somewhat difficult position. Our patrol, which lost one Indian officer and twelve other ranks killed and three Sepoys wounded, inflicted some sixty casualties on the enemy. For their gallant conduct on this occasion, No. 1534 Sepoy Ali Khan was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, 2nd
Class, and No. 115 Sepoy Faiz Ali Khan the Distinguished Conduct Medal.
During the first fortnight in January [1915] little direct news of the enemy’s advance was forthcoming, though
reports of considerable preparations in Syria were constant, and information was received to the effect that advanced posts and depots had been formed at Khan Tunis, El Arish, El Auja, and Kosseima. The country to the east of the Canal within the radius of our aeroplane reconnaissances remained clear of formed bodies
of hostile troops, though frequently visited by Bedouin patrols which, in some cases, were accompanied by German officers in Arab dress.
About 15th January, however, it became clear that hostile forces of some strength had entered Sinai, and on the 20th the Canal Defence troops were reinforced from Cairo by the 1st and 3rd Brigades R.F.A., East Lancashire Division, T.F., which proceeded at once to previously prepared positions.
On 18th January a hostile force of 8,000-10,000 was located near Bir-es-Saba by a French naval hydro-aeroplane, and on 22nd a Turkish force was reported to be at Moiya Harab, having arrived there from Gifgaffa. This was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance the next day, and about the same time reports of the presence of hostile troops at Ain Sadr were received, and our mounted troops obtained touch with hostile patrols near Bir-el-Duiedar.
On the 22nd small detachments were told off from the reserves to hold lightly the trenches prepared along the west bank.
On the 26th forces of some 2,000-3,000 men each were located at Bir Mabeuik, Moiya Harab, and Wadi Muksheib, and the enemy advanced and engaged our covering troops near Kantara, retiring at.3.30 p.m.. On the same day two battalions 32nd Brigade (33rd Punjabis and 4th Gwalior Infantry), were sent to hold the
trenches along the west bank from Bench Mark post to Ballah; while G.O-C.’s of sections reinforced the west bank trenches in their sections from local reserves. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade arrived from Cairo, the Otago and Wellington battalions proceeding to reinforce Kubri, while Headquarters and the Auckland and Canterbury battalions detrained at Ismailia., H.M.S. “Swiftsure,” “Clio,” “Ocean,” and ” Minerva” entered the canal, taking station near Kantara, Ballah, El Shatt, and Shalouf respectively.
During the 27th and 28th the enemy was further reinforced, and established himself in an entrenched position about five miles east of Kantara, astride the El Arish road. On the morning of the 27th attacks on the Baluchistan and El Kubri posts in No. 1 Section were made at about 3 a.m. Both were beaten off without loss. On the morning of the 28th the outposts at Kantara were attacked, and the enemy was driven off with little difficulty. One battalion from 31st Brigade (2nd Rajputs) was sent to reinforce Serapeum.
From the 29th-31st the enemy closed towards the Canal, the largest concentration appearing in the vicinity of Gebel Habeita. The 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery, was sent to Toussoum.
On the 1st February an advance from the north-east towards the Ismailia Ferry post was detected, and that post, as well as Bench Mark post, was reinforced under the orders of the General Officer Commanding No. 2 Section.
On the 2nd February our advanced troops from Ismailia Ferry encountered the enemy at some distance from the post, and a desultory action ensued. This was broken off at 3.30 p.m., and the enemy then entrenched himself about 2.5 miles south-east of our defences. In the course of the day considerable bodies of troops were also seen on the move in front of El Ferdan, Bench Mark, Toussoum and Serapeum. During the night of the 2nd-3rd some firing at El Kubri took place, but nothing further of note occurred in No. 1 Section.
At about 3.30 a.m. on the 3rd a determined attempt was made to effect a crossing some 2,000 yards south of Toussoum. The enemy brought up a number of pontoons and rafts, several of which they succeeded in launching while two, if not more, actually crossed the Canal. This attack was covered by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the east bank. It was met by parties of the 62nd Punjabis under Major Skeen and Captain Morgan, as well as by fire from the 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery. Several pontoons were sunk, and all the men who crossed were disposed, of, except twenty, who hid under the west bank and surrendered to the 2nd Rajputs next morning.
At daylight [3rd] the enemy were found to have closed on the Toussoum post, and a counter-attack pushed forward from Serapeum encountered a large force about half a mile from camp. The enemy’s attack was not
pushed closer than three-quarters of a mile from our position, and they retired about 2 p.m. after shelling our positions, intermittently up to that time. Seven officers and 280 men were taken prisoners opposite Toussoum during the course of the fight. . A large number of the enemy’s dead were found outside Toussoum post, and along the east bank of the Canal.
At 4.30 p.m. two battalions 31st Brigade (27th Punjabis and 128th Pioneers) arrived at Serapeum, and Major-General A. Wallace, Commanding 11th [Indian] Division, took over command of the Section from the Great Bitter Lake to Lake Timsah.
During the morning H.M.S. ” Hardinge ” was struck by two 6-inch shells, her funnel being split and forward
steering gear disabled. Shemoved into Lake Timsah; and later in the day to Kantara, her place being taken by H.M.S. “Swiftsure.” H.M.S.”Ocean” also moved up into this section.of the defence. At Ismailia Ferry post the enemy were found at daylight to be entrenching some 700-800 yards from the defences, and two hostile batteries opened fire shortly afterwards. The infantry attack was not pushed home, and no casualties occurred,
though many shells burst in the camp and in the vicinity of the town. Shipping detained in Lake Timsah was under fire and suffered slight damage, but no loss of life.
Circumstances were similar at El Ferdan, where a considerable number of shells were fired, chiefly at the Canal Gare and railway station, both of which were damaged. No casualties occurred.
At Kantara the outposts were attacked between 5 and 6 a.m., the enemy being driven off, leaving many killed and wounded and unwounded prisoners. Later in the day a partial attack from the south-east was stopped some 1,200 yards from the position.
During the day H.M.S. “Swiftsure,” “Clio,” “Hardinge” and the French ships “Requin” and “D’Entrecasteaux” were engaged, as were also the torpedo boats and armed launches, all rendering valuable services. The bulk of the fighting fell to the 22nd and 29th [Indian] Infantry Brigades, but the 28th, as well as portions of the 31st, 32nd, and New Zealand Infantry Brigades, the Artillery and Engineers of the Lancashire Division,T.F., and No. 3 Field Company Australian Engineers, were also engaged. Very efficient service was rendered by the detachment Royal Flying Corps, several reconnaissances over the enemy’s lines being undertaken during the
day.
The enemy engaged at different points along the Canal on the 3rd appeared to number some 12,000 to 15,000 en in the aggregate, and six batteries, with at least one 6-inch gun, were located.: It appears from accounts
received from prisoners that the attacking force consisted of the VIIIth and portions of the Illrd, IVth, and Vlth Turkish Army Corps and that Djemal Pasha was in chief command. The enemy’s plan contemplated simultaneous attacks on Kantara, Ferdan, Ismailia, Shalouf; and Suez, coupled, with the main effort to cross the Canal near Toussoum. At the first three of the above-mentioned places their efforts were only half-hearted, while at Shalouf and Suez no attacks materialised, though forces are known to have been in the vicinity of those places.
Headquarters, with the 7th and 8th Battalions, 2nd Brigade, 1st Australian Imperial Force, arrived at Ismailia during the evening of the 3rd February.
On the 4th February, as some firing had taken place from the east bank during the night, two companies of the 92nd Punjabis were sent out at 8 a.m. to clear that bank, and located a body of some 200 to 250 men still entrenched there. On the approach of this detachment the enemy made signs of surrender, but subsequently reopened fire. Supports of one double company each of the 27th and 67th Punjabis and 128th Pioneers were
despatched under the command of Major Maclachlan, 92nd Punjabis, who concentrated his men, opened a heavy fire, and then charged. This time the enemy threw away their rifles and surrendered, six officers, 251 men, and three machine guns being captured; 59 men, including a German officer (Major von den Hagen), were found killed at this point.
The trenches in front of Ismailia and Kantara were found to have been deserted, and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, supported by infantry, moved out from the Ismailia Ferry post. A large body of enemy,
estimated at three to four brigades, were encountered seven miles east of Toussoum, and another body some miles to the north. Twenty five prisoners and ninety camels were captured. No other incident occurred along the front.
Reinforcements, consisting of the Herts Yeomanry, 2nd County of London Yeomanry (Westminster Dragoons), and one squadron Duke of Lancaster’s Own Yeomanry, arrived at Ismailia the same evening.
On the 5th instant our aeroplanes reported that the enemy were retiring towards Katia, while those who had been in front of No. 2 Section appeared to have concentrated about Gebel Habeita. Mabeuik was still occupied, and a reconnaissance from No. 1 Section encountered some of the enemy’s infantry near Gebel Murr during the day. There was no change during the 6th, the enemy being still in strength near Gebel Habeita. A reconnaissance by a mixed force, which had been contemplated this day, was cancelled owing to information gathered from prisoners to the effect that considerable reinforcements of the enemy were expected and might be at hand about this time. On the 7th, however, our aeroplanes found this camp deserted. Mabeuik was also
found to have been vacated, and the nearest enemy on the northern line appeared at Bir-El-Abd. On the 9th the only enemy located were in camps at El Rigum, Wadi Muksheib, and Moiya Harab. On the 10th instant only some 400 men were left at Rigum camp, and these appeared to be moving eastwards.
The actions at Toussoum and Kantara. I will now supplement the general summary of events given in the foregoing paragraphs with a more detailed account of the fighting that took place at Toussoum on 3rd February,
and at Kantara on 28th January and 3rd February. The troops in the Toussoum-Serapeum-Deversoir portion of No. 2 Section on the morning of 3rd February were as follows: —
The 19th Lancashire Battery, R.F.A., T.F. (four guns), commanded by Major B. Palin Dobson.
The 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two maxims), commanded by Major I. D’E. Roberts, R.A.
1st Field Company, East Lancashire Royal Engineers, T.F. (two sections), under Captain J. G. Riddick.
Canterbury Battalion, New Zealand Infantry (two platoons), under Major C. B. Brereton.
2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajputs, under Lieut.-Colonel F. P. S. Dunsford.
62nd Punjabis, under Lieut.-Colonel E. W. Grimshaw.
92nd Punjabis, under Major T. R. Maclachlan.
2/10th Gurkha Rifles, under Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton.
128th Pioneers (two platoons, acting as escort to 5th Battery, Egyptian Artillery), under Lieutenant R. A. Fitzgibbon.
137th Field Ambulance, under Major R. W. Knox, I.M.S.
These troops were disposed as follows:
(a) On the east bank, in the posts of Toussoum, Serapeum, and Deversoir, a half battalion in each, furnished by the 92nd, 62nd, and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, respectively.
(6) On the west bank, from the entrance to Lake Timsah to Deversoir inclusive, 12 posts, each held by two platoons. Each platoon was allotted some 600 yards of front and found three sentry groups, about 200 yards apart.
(c) In reserve at Serapeum, three double companies.
At about 3.25 a.m. on 3rd instant, the enemy were seen on the east bank near mile 47.4. As the firing was heavy, a double company of the 62nd Punjabis was sent from the reserve to support this point, and this double
company was subsequently reinforced by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.
The enemy made three distinct attempts to cross the Canal at points between miles 47.4 and 48.4. One boatload of the enemy landed opposite mile 48.3, and were charged by a small party under Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis. All were killed or wounded. Two more boatloads landed opposite mile 47.6, and these were promptly attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan, 62nd Punjabis, who was wounded. Six Turks were killed and four captured at this point, and some 20 who got away and hid themselves under the west bank were captured later by a party of the 2nd Rajputs.
At 8.40 a.m. Colonel S. Geoghegan, commanding 22nd Brigade, after a personal reconnaissance of the enemy’s positions, sent a detachment consisting of four double companies drawn from the 2nd Rajputs and the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles to clear the east bank. As this counter-attack developed, the enemy fled in large numbers from the broken ground whence they had made their attempt to cross. Meanwhile the enemy, from their camp at Kateid El Khel, deployed a force estimated at two brigades with at least six guns, and formed a line about
two miles north-east of Serapeum, and facing that post. Our troops, delivering a counterattack, now occupied a ridge about half a mile north-east of Serapeum, and formed a line facing the enemy with their left flank drawn
back to the Canal. They consisted of two east, two platoons 2nd Rajputs facing north, with six platoons 2/10th Gurkha Rifles in support. The whole was under command of Lieut.-Col. F. G. H. Button, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.
The advance northward on the east bank of the two platoons, 2nd Rajputs, was checked short of the broken ground by fire from the enemy posted there, aided by the fire of small parties which were still hidden at the foot of the west bank. It was here that Captain R. T. Arundell was killed while gallantly leading his men.
While this attack wag in progress, the Commander of H.M. T.B. No. 043, Lieutenant-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., was asked by Colonel Geoghegan to destroy the enemy’s pontoons which were lying on the east bank. Those on shore were destroyed by shell fire, and a party then landed from the boat to see whether there were
any others lying behind the bank. The leading party found themselves in front of a trench full of the enemy,
and on getting back to their boat Lieutenant-Commander G. B. Palmes, R.N., and Sub-Lieutenant C. V. Cardinall, R.N.V.R., were wounded.
The enemy’s main attack from the north-east did not get within 1,200 yards of our line. They, however, shelled our positions on the west bank intermittently until about 2 p.m., when their main body retired eastwards, and our forces withdrew to the positions held in the morning. A small party of the enemy reached the ridge which we had vacated, but they were shelled off it by our artillery, and soon disappeared.
In the attack on the Toussoum post, about 350 of the enemy managed to establish themselves during the night in some of the outer trenches which are only occupied by the garrison by day. A number of this party were killed as soon, as it was light by the fire of our machine guns, and the remainder were either driven out or killed, and some 80 prisoners captured by a local counter-attack which was skilfully led by Lieutenant J. W. Thomson-Glover, 92nd Punjabis. Seven Turkish officers and 280 other ranks, with much material, were taken on this occasion.
At 4.30 p.m. reinforcements from the 31st Infantry Brigade began to arrive at Serapeum, and in the course of the evening four double companies were placed in support at various points on the west bank, and the garrison of the Serapeum post was strengthened.
The armed launches commanded by Lieutenants W. H. B. Livesay and E. H. Daughlish, R.I.M., rendered valuable service in this section during the day, and were frequently under fire of the enemy’s snipers.
On the morning of the 4th instant, as there was no sign of the enemy’s main body to the east, and as the armed launch “Mansura ” had been fired upon on the previous evening and some sniping had taken place during the night from the east bank, Major-General A. Wallace, who had taken over command at Serapeum from Colonel S. Geoghegan, ordered two double companies of the 92nd Punjabis to move north along the east bank of the Canal to examine this locality. This party, which was commanded by Captain L. F. A. Cochran,
got to the south) edge of this area, which they found to be held by the enemy, and then extended round to the east and north-east to round the latter up. The enemy held up a white flag and made signs of surrender, whereupon Captain Cochran and some of hie party advanced towards them. After three Turks had surrendered, fire was re-opened by the enemy, and our troops had to fall back. Major-General Wallace then ordered out reinforcements, consisting of one double company each of the 27th and 62nd Punjabis and the 128th
Pioneers, the whole under Major T. R. Maclachlan, 92nd Punjabis. The latter collected his men and charged, and the enemy immediately threw down their arms. The prisoners taken here numbered six officers and 251 men, of whom 52 were seriously wounded. The enemy’s killed numbered 59, and among them was a German officer, Major von den Hagen. Three machine guns were captured, as well as a quantity of miscellaneous stores. It was in this second attack that Captain Cochran was killed.
Turning from events at Toussoum to those at Kantara, the only engagements that need be referred to are the attacks made by the enemy on our outposts on the 28th January and 3rd February. In the attack of the 28th
January, the enemy advanced along the telegraph line on one of our piquets, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Sikhs under Captain Channer, which they attacked about 2.45 a.m. The action continued for about half an hour, and the enemy attempted to advance, but was unable to do so. Firing gradually ceased, and by daylight the enemy had withdrawn gradually to Point 70 on the Kantara – El Arish road, from which they were driven out by five rounds of lyddite shell fired by H.M.S. “Swiftsure.”
The attack of the 3rd February was conducted on much the same lines, and was directed on two of our piquets furnished by the 89th Punjabis. The enemy’s advance was stopped without difficulty, and at daylight 36 unwounded prisoners were found in our entanglements. The enemy left 20 dead on the ground, but their casualties were very much heavier, as they removed many of their killed and wounded.
As the events described may represent but the opening phase of the campaign, I do not propose, at this stage, to mention the staff and departmental officers who have rendered specially good service. I, however, submit the
names of the following regimental officers whose conduct is deserving of notice:
19th Lancashire Battery, R.F.A. (T.F.).—
This battery rendered excellent service, and was well commanded by Major B. Palin Dobson. He was ably seconded by Captain P. K. Clapham.
5th Battery Artillery, Egyptian Army.—
This battery took a prominent part in defeating the attempts of the enemy to cross the Canal, and its fire sank two or more pontoons. It was skilfully commanded by Bimbashi (Major) I. D’E. Roberts, R.A. Mulazim Awal Effendi Helmi, who was killed, showed conspicuous gallantry, and fought his gun under a heavy fire at short range. He would have been recommended for reward had he survived.
Imperial Service Troops.—
Major A. K. Rawlins, 24th Punjabis, and Captain G. C. W. Willis, 31st Lancers, Special Service Officers, have displayed energy and enterprise, their reconnaissance work being particularly valuable.
2nd- Queen Victoria’s Own Rajputs.—
Captain R. T. Arundell led his double company with great gallantry in the counter-attack on the 3rd February, in which engagement he was killed.
Jemadar Partab Singh proved himself a cool and capable leader in trying circumstances.
Jemadar Assa Singh held an exposed position throughout the day, and the skill with which he controlled and directed a covering fire proved of great assistance to troops crossing gullies where they were exposed to the enemy’s fire.
62nd Punjabis.-
Major O. St. J. Skeen displayed great promptitude and courage in charging the enemy when disembarking from
their pontoons on the 3rd February. His skilful leading in the attack of the 4th February was instrumental in causing the surrender of the enemy, upon whose trenches he brought to bear an effective enfilading fire.
Captain M. H. L. Morgan, by his exertions and example, frustrated a very determined attempt of the enemy to effect a landing. Though wounded early on the 3rd, he continued in command of his double company throughout the day.
Subadar Kalu Khan and Jemadar Sher Zaman Khan supported Major Skeen very pluckily on the 3rd, and Jemadar Sher Zaman Khan again distinguished himself in the action of the 4th February.
92nd Punjabis.—
Major T. .R. Maclachlan commanded the garrison of the Toussoum post with great ability on the 3rd February, and showed resourcefulness and capacity for command in the final stage of the fight on the 4th.
Captain W. H. Hastings, as machine-gun officer at Toussoum, rendered valuable service in stopping the enemy’s attempts to bring boats on to the Canal and in preventing the retreat of the enemy when they were turned out of the trenches which they had occupied.
Lieutenant J. W. Thomson-Glover, 35th Sikhs (attached 92nd Punjabis), led the counter-attack at Toussoum very gallantly.
Lieutenant H. Greene took over the command of Captain Cochran’s double company after the latter was killed, and handled it very well.
Subadar Major Farman Ali led his men very gallantly and ably assisted Lieutenant Thomson-Glover.
128th Pioneers.—
Lieutenant R. A. Fitzgibbon behaved with conspicuous gallantry. When severely wounded he ran a considerable distance under fire with a message to the 5th Egyptian Battery. He has since died of his
wounds.
2nd Battalion, 10th Gurkha Rifles.—
Captain H. E. Weekes led his double company skilfully and displayed promptitude and initiative in supporting the double company of the 2nd Rajputs after Captain Arundell had been killed.
137th Field Ambulance.—
Major R. M. Knox, I.M.S., and his officers were energetic and expeditious in the disposal of the large number of wounded on their hands.
I submit a list of the non-commissioned officers and men whose names have been brought to notice for gallant conduct, with particulars of the services they have rendered. [This extensive list can be seen at the online “London Gazette” for which I have provided a link, below]
All the units engaged proved cool under fire and did their duty in a highly satisfactory manner, the conduct of officers and men being all that could be desired.
In conclusion I desire to express my high appreciation of the valuable work done by the pilots and observers of the French hydroaeroplane squadron and the detachment Royal Flying Corps in the numerous reconnaissances carried out by them previous to and during the advance of the enemy. They were constantly
under shrapnel and rifle fire and carried out their difficult and dangerous duties with courage, resourcefulness and success.
I have, &c.,
ALEX. WILSON, Major-General
Links
This despatch in the “London Gazette”
Defeat of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, February 1915