The defeat of the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, February 1915

The northern and central sectors of the Suez canal defences, with the Sinai to the east. Kantara, El Ferdan and Ismailia developed into important locations for the British forces. The Sweet Water Canal lies a short distance to the west of the main canal. In December 1914, Turkish forces were arriving across the Sinai at El Arish (top right).

Quoting from the British Official History of Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine [with my bold, italics and parentheses]

On the 28th [January 1915] aeroplanes located a force of between three and four thousand [Turkish troops] 8 miles east of Deversoir in the central Sector [of the Canal Defences], which was next day observed to have increased considerably. A reconnaissance by the enemy on the morning of the 28th against the Qantara [Katnara] bridgehead, on the east bank, which reached the barbed wire, resulted in six casualties among the Sepoys of the 14th Sikhs and the 1/6th Gurkhas in the post. The Turks left three dead in front of the wire and dragged away several wounded.

On the 30th January the enemy closed in generally, the greatest concentration being observed east of Bir Habeita, about nine miles east of the Canal at Serapeum. He had been unable to disguise his intentions, and General Wilson [Major-General Sir Alexander Andrew Wilson, commanding the canal defences] awaited the main attack upon the 2nd or central Sector, with sufficient forces deployed upon the Canal and with strong reserves.

From enemy perspective: the main [Turkish] body marched from Beersheba, through El Auja and Ibni, between the hill-ranges of Maghara and Yelleg, through Jifjafa upon Ismailia. Smaller detachments moved by El Arish upon Qantara and through Nekhl against Suez. The object of these two latter was merely to keep the enemy in doubt as to the point at which the main attack was to be made. The only trouble of the main body was bombing by British and French aeroplanes. These, it is admitted, caused panic at first, but the troops soon got used to them. The Turkish force was provided neither with aeroplanes nor weapons of defence against them. Kress makes one very illuminating statement: “The Army Commander, Djemal Pasha, had expected that his appearance on the Canal would be followed by arising of the Egyptian Nationalists.” In this hope “he was deceived. There remained, however, an attainable goal, to force his way suddenly astride the Canal, hold the crossing a few days, and in that time close the Canal permanently.”

From the 31st January onwards the British troops stationed along the Canal expected the attack at any moment and, having had ample warning of its approach, awaited it with confidence.

The dispositions of the enemy, so far as they could be discovered, were on the 1st February as follows :-—
At Bir Habeita, 6 miles east of Serapeum, at least 2,500 infantry and apparently two guns; at Moiya Harab,
30 miles to the south-east and in a position such that they might be intended either to reinforce the former body or to strike at the 1st Sector in the neighbourhood of Shallufa, about 8,000 men; further north, at Bir el Mahadat, 10 miles E.N.E. of El Ferdan, about 3,000 men. On the other hand, trenches which had been dug by the Turks 5 miles north-east of Qantara now seemed to have been evacuated, and behind, at Bir ed Dueidar, only about 300 men could be seen, though the palm grove of this oasis was certainly large enough to conceal many more. In rear, on the northern Sinai route at Bir el Abd, 40 miles east of the Canal, and at El Arish on the Palestine frontier; on the southern route at Nekhl; there appeared to be further considerable forces.

No move by the Turks was detected on this day but for a slight advance opposite Ismailia Ferry Post, as a result of which the bridgehead there and Bench Mark Post, 2 miles to north of it, were reinforced. A little further north small bodies of the enemy in the desert east of El Ferdan were scattered by the fire of HMS Clio from her station near Ballah.

On the morning of the 2nd February it was discovered by patrols from Ismailia Ferry Post that there had been a further advance opposite that point during the night.

Same source. My highlights.

Small detachments which moved out from the bridgehead made contact with the enemy and were in action till about 3.30 p.m. A high wind, which had grown stronger as the day wore on, whipped up the sand till the troops found themselves almost in darkness, and aerial reconnaissance became impossible. The enemy showed no immediate intention of coming to close quarters. He apparently entrenched himself in the evening 2.5 miles south-east of the British defences. Not only at the Ferry Post but on the whole twenty mile front from Deversoir to El Ferdan the British outposts were in touch with the enemy during the day. The Clio again came into action, driving the groups on which she fired out of range.

It was now more than ever certain that the attack would fall upon the central Sector, though still unknown whether its main weight would be directed north or south of Lake Timsah. In view of the enemy’s activity in front of El Ferdan further reinforcements were brought up to that point: an armoured train with four platoons of New Zealand infantry, and two platoons to support the 5th Gurkhas in the post on the east bank. In that part of the sector between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah there were now the following troops:

  • 19th Lancashire Battery RFA (T) (four 15-pdrs.)
  • 5th Battery Egyptian Artillery (four mountain guns and two maxims)
  • 1st Field Company East Lancashire Royal Engineers (T) (two sections)
  • 22nd Indian Infantry Brigade, less 3rd Brahmans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles)
  • 2nd Q.V.O. Rajputs
  • Two platoons 128th Pioneers (escort to the Egyptian battery)
  • 137th (Indian) Field Ambulance.

Of these there were six companies on the east bank; two of the 92nd Punjabis in the Tussum Post, two of the 92nd in that of Serapeum, and two of the Gurkhas at Deversoir. On the west bank were eleven posts each held by two platoons, each platoon on a frontage of some 600 yards and finding three sentry posts 200 yards apart. In reserve at Serapeum were three companies. At the first sign of the attack a company of the 62nd Punjabis was ordered up from here to the danger point, mile-post 47.4, a little south of Tussum, and this company was subsequently reinforced by six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs.

The sand storm continued into the night. The Indian sentries, peering into the darkness, their faces screened in their puggarees and the breeches of their rifles wrapped round with rags, saw and heard nothing till 3.25 a.m. on the 3rd February, when an observation post at Tussum heard troops passing south-east of the post and towards the Canal bank. A moment later loud shouting and howling broke out south of the post. Major T. R. Maclachlan, who was in command, moved a machine gun and half a platoon down to the southern flank of the post to rake the east bank. The shouting thereupon ceased and the enemy replied with ineffective machine-gun fire.

Still there was nothing to be seen. Then the moon, only two days past full, emerged from the clouds, and dark masses were discerned moving slowly down the gullies on the east bank towards the water. Presently these masses were discovered to be pontoons and rafts carried by squads of men. At 4.20 am. the Egyptian battery, which had moved to this point the previous day and dug in on the top of the high west bank in order to obtain a field of view, opened fire, with good results, for it was soon observed that the two foremost pontoons had been abandoned. With the assistance of rifle fire from the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers at Post No. 5, the battery checked most of the attempts of the enemy to carry his craft down to the water. It is not clear whether the Turks had intended to make their first crossing at this point or whether the other detachments moving on the Canal had been slightly delayed in the darkness by the rough ground. At all events, within a few minutes gangs carrying pontoons appeared upon the east bank on a frontage of a mile and a half from a short distance north of the point of the first attempt. The rapid fire of the defenders caused most of the craft to be abandoned on the bank, while the pontoons which reached the water were quickly holed and sunk.

Three pontoons only crossed the Canal, under cover of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire now opened by the enemy from the sand-dunes close to the east bank. To the south, a boat-load of Turks landed opposite mile-post 48.3, on the front of Post No.6. The party was instantly charged with the bayonet by a small body under Major O. St. J. Skeen, 62nd Punjabis, and all killed or wounded. The other two boat-loads landed at the original point, opposite mile-post 47.6. This party was at once attacked by Captain M. H. L. Morgan and Lieut. R. A. FitzGibbon with small detachments of the 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers from Post No. 5. Six Turks were killed and four wounded; about twenty escaped and hid under the west bank, where they were later rounded up and captured by a party of the 2nd Rajputs. The small parties which made these gallant attacks were the only Turks to cross the Suez Canal, save as prisoners, in the course of the war. The fire from the east bank was intense and well directed, and casualties among the defenders began to mount up. But as the light improved it was seen how roughly the enemy had been handled. His iron pontoons, rafts, and other abandoned material littered the east bank, along which also lay many dead. His surprise crossing had been a complete failure.

From a German-language map, said to be of 1914, showing some detail of the stretch of canal between Serapeum and El Ferdan.

Yet the Turkish command had by no means abandoned hope. At dawn an attack was launched against Tussum
Post, and the enemy artillery began to shell the British positions, the warships in the Canal, and merchant shipping moored in Lake Timsah. The Hardinge and Requin in turn opened fire upon parties of Turkish infantry in the desert, as they became visible, and by the time it was daylight the action was general. It was now discovered that the Turks were holding a trench 200 yards south of Tussum Post, facing westward. Enfilade fire from the machine guns in the post practically destroyed this party. It was next found that a larger body of the enemy, some 350 strong, had made a lodgment in the British day trenches east and south of the post. At 7 a.m. a counter-attack from the southern flank of the post, led by Captain H. M. Rigg, 92nd Puniabis, recaptured a portion of these trenches and took 70 prisoners.

At 11 a.m. a further counter-attack was carried out against the day trenches by Lieut. J. W. Thomson-Glover, 35th Sikhs, attached 92nd Punjabis, from the northern end of the post. This was completely successful, though not until 3.30 p.m. were the whole of the trenches regained. In all 7 Turkish officers and 280 other ranks were captured or killed and a quantity of material taken in these trenches.

Br.-General S. Geoghegan, commanding the 22nd Indian Brigade, observing at 6.30 a.m. that there was no sign of an attack south of Serapeum, decided to collect at that point sufficient troops to clear the Turks still in front of or south of Tussum Post out of the trenches and sandhills. Two companies of the 2/10th Gurkhas with their machine guns moved up from Deversoir to Serapeum, where six platoons of the 2nd Rajputs had also been collected. Crossing by the ferry, two platoons of the Rajputs with the two companies of the 92nd Punjabis from the post on their right, began at 8.40 a.m. to advance up the east bank towards Tussum. As this movement continued, the enemy broke in surprisingly large numbers from hummocks and sandhills in the neighbourhood of the point from which his southern boat-load had crossed during the night. But at the same moment a considerable Turkish force came into the open some three miles to the north-east, deployed, and, supported by two batteries, began to advance in the direction of Serapeum Post.

Against this superior force the British counter-attack was unable to continue. The Rajputs, pushing on along the
bank, came under heavy fire and lost the officer commanding the detachment, Captain R. T. Arundell, before they were brought to a standstill. The Punjabis were concentrated on the right to face the Turkish attack, and six platoons of the 2/10th Gurkhas moved up into support, the whole detachment on the east bank being now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel F. G. H. Sutton, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. But the little force held its ground and its determined front brought the enemy’s attack to a standstill, nowhere nearer than 1,200 yards to the British line.

A second cause of the failure on the part of the Turks to press the attack was probably the fire of the French warships Requin and D’ Entrecasteaux, of which more will be said later. The abandoned pontoons lying along the Asiatic bank constituted a certain danger, as there was a possibility of their being again employed after the fall of darkness, should the enemy re-establish himself in force upon the bank. About 7.45 am, Br.-General Geoghegan requested Lieut.-Commander G, B. Palmes, R.N., in command of T.B. 043 at Deversoir, to destroy these. The torpedo boat moved up the Canal, firing two rounds from its 3-pdr. into each pontoon. Lieut.-Commander Palmes then landed to see if any still lay behind the east bank, and succeeded in blowing up two more with gun-cotton. Finally he almost walked into a trench full of Turks, but succeeded in regaining his dinghy.

While the attacks on Tussum and Serapeum were in progress, another Turkish force, advancing from the southeast, threatened Ismailia Ferry Post, on the other side of Lake Timsah. This attack was never seriously pressed, the enemy’s advanced troops entrenching some eight hundred yards from the defences. On the other hand his artillery, well handled, speedily became menacing. It appeared that the two field batteries were in action in support of the infantry, while from far out in the desert a 15-cm. howitzer battery also opened fire. At 8.15 a.m. these guns, which had been directed against the Hardinge but had hitherto been shooting short, began to straddle the ship. First a ricochet carried away the wireless aerial. A few minutes later a high explosive shell struck the forward funnel, another the base of the after funnel; next a shell from one of the heavy howitzers burst over the fore part of the ship, causing casualties to the guns’ crews. The steering gear was damaged and the fore stokehold rendered untenable. It was only too evident to Commander Linberry that the heavy guns had his range exactly. If he remained where he was there was considerable risk that his ship, unarmoured and highly vulnerable, would be sunk in the channel.

Imperial War Museum photograph Q61536, “British troopship Hardinge at Suez 1915”

At 8.45 a.m., therefore, the Hardinge slipped and proceeded to anchor in Lake Timsah, outside the fairway. The heavy howitzers fired only three or four rounds more at her, then switched to another target. The artillery defence of Tussum now fell largely upon the Requin, the only warship in the area, except the armed tug Mansourah and T.B. 043, both armed with light guns. She was searching for the enemy’s field artillery and shelling small groups of infantry in front of Ismailia Ferry Post with her 10-cm. guns when she came under the fire of the 15-cm. howitzers which had previously engaged the Hardinge.

From “The Sphere” Saturday 27 February 1915 [British Newspaper Archive] The article goes on to say “During the fighting along the Suez Canal one of the principal places attacked was the Ismailia ferry, shown above. The old Bedouin caravan route by which the Turks advanced to the ferry is shown on the right side of the Canal in the above picture. The actual gap through the hills by which the advance was made is marked with an arrow. The Turks brought up to the Canal bank in their attack pontoon boats made of galvanised steel rafts, ingeniously constructed of American “tenekes” as kerosine tins are called in Turkey, attached to one another by hooks and rings fitted into wooden frames. A Rome report also mentions ten aluminium boats and an aluminium bridge which are “supposed to have been intended by the Turks to facilitate the crossing of the Canal, evidence, if it be true, of German help in the Turkish preparations. A large wooden structure, apparently a raft, fitted on wheels and alternative wooden rollers, which was brought within a few miles of the Canal, appears to have been burnt, while nothing was seen of the famous india rubber bridge of which the reports of the Bedouin had much to tell. Despite all these elaborate preparations, however, no crossing of the Canal was effected, and the Turks were driven back.”

She could not find the enemy battery, the shooting of which became more and more accurate. Presently it straddled the ship and the situation became uncomfortable. The crews of the 10-cm. guns, which had no protection, were moved beneath the shelter of the steel deck, and a bigger head of steam raised in case the ship should have to shift her moorings. One 27.4-cm. turret gun alone remained in action, at first without effect. But at 9 o’clock a puff of smoke was observed in the desert, corresponding with the fall of a big shell near the ship. It was estimated that the Turkish howitzers were firing from a point 9,200 metres distant. Fire was accordingly opened with the turret gun at ranges varying from 9,000 to 9,500 metres. After the third round the heavy howitzer fire ceased suddenly and was not resumed, a serious danger to the Canal being thus removed.
The Requin did further good work opposite Tussum and Serapeum, aided by the cruiser D’Entrecasteaux. The
latter had received orders to move up and replace the disabled Hardinge. Subsequently these orders were cancelled, as the flagship Swiftsure was on her way down from Qantara to carry out that task. The D’Entrecasteaux therefore moved about three-quarters of a mile north of Deversoir and then received the wireless message: “Repulse the attack on Serapeum.” She could see Requin’s shells bursting east of that point and she herself at once opened fire with her 14-cm. guns. The crossfire from the heavy guns of the two French ships was now therefore directed upon the area of the Turkish deployment. It was probably in great measure owing to the moral effect of the melinite that the Turkish troops could not here be induced to advance. The enemy had now been definitely repulsed between Serapeum and Tussum. His artillery continued to shell the west bank intermittently till 2 p.m., when fire ceased. The silence that followed indicated that the action had
been broken off, and bodies of Turks were soon seen moving eastward, to be hastened on their way by the 24-cm. gun of the D’Entrecasteaux, firing at extreme range. The force under Lieut.-Colonel Sutton which had carried out the counter-attack now withdrew to its former position north of Serapeum, About half an hour later a small body of the enemy occupied the ridge which it had evacuated, but was shelled off it by the British artillery.

Opposite Ismailia the enemy’s artillery persisted longer, numerous shells falling in the bridgehead and camp, though without causing any casualties. But at 3.30 pm the Requin apparently silenced a battery firing on the shipping in the Timsah, and here, as further south, the action now died down.

Reinforcements of the 31st Indian Brigade, which began to arrive at Serapeum at 4.30 p.m., were not required, but they were retained in positions of close support at various points in view of the possibility that the offensive would be renewed. Major-General A. Wallace, commanding the 11th Indian Division, took over command of the front between the Great Bitter Lake and Lake Timsah. The Swiftsure had now taken up the former berth of the Hardinge, the Ocean had also moved to this part of the front, and the Hardinge had been sent to replace the Swiftsure at Qantara.

Further reinforcements for the front at Ismailia, of Headquarters 2nd Australian Brigade, with the 7th and 8th Battalions Australian Infantry, arrived in the town during the evening. All was ready for the fresh attack which, it seemed probable, would have to be met in the morning. The night passed quietly, save for some musketry fire from the east bank south of Tussum Post.

Elsewhere the attacks on the Canal had been of minor importance, nowhere pressed with energy sufficient to give Major-General Wilson a moment’s inquietude or uncertainty as to the enemy’s real plan. In the Suez sector the enemy did not come to close quarters. Fire was exchanged between a small detachment and the post on the east bank at El Kubri, after which the Turks withdrew.

Against El Ferdan, the northernmost post of the 2nd Sector, the infantry attack was equally feeble. There had been some firing on this part of the front before dawn, and daylight discovered two lines of trenches dug about two and a half miles from the Canal. On these the Clio opened fire. Soon after 9 a.m. two Turkish field guns began firing on the railway station, making good practice and securing several direct hits. The Clio located and engaged these guns within less than half an hour, whereupon the Turks turned their attention to her, continuing to do remarkably pretty shooting. She was hit twice and had some small damage done to one of her guns, but she sustained no casualties among her crew. By 10.30 a.m. she had silenced the Turkish guns. During the afternoon she had further practice against bodies of the enemy seen falling back towards the northeast.

At Qantara, in the 3rd Sector, there was a rather stronger attack, between 5 and 6 a.m., upon two piquets furnished by the 89th Punjabis. The machine guns and rifles of the piquets caused heavy loss to the enemy when he came up against the British barbed-wire defences, and he was driven off without difficulty. Thirty-six prisoners were subsequently brought in here and 20 dead found outside the wire. These figures did not represent the whole of the enemy’s losses, as he carried off further dead and wounded in his retirement.

These feint attacks had all been conducted with so little resolution as to fail completely in their object. There were known to be further detachments of the enemy in the Suez Sector in the neighbourhood of posts other than at El Kubri, but they did not appear within machine-gun range of Baluchistan, Gurkha or Shallufa.

Amazingly quick reporting from the “Sheffield Daily Telegraph” of Saturday 6 February 1915 [British Newspaper Archive]

4 February 1915. To the astonishment of the garrison of the central Sector, expecting a renewal of the attack, it was discovered when day broke that the bulk of the Turkish force had disappeared. There were, however, at least some snipers south of Tussum Post, about mile-post 48.3, whence shots had been fired during the night. Br.-General Geoghegan ordered Captain L. F. A. Cochran to advance north along the east bank with two companies 92nd Punjabis from Serapeum Post and clear the area between it and Tussum. Captain Cochran moved along the bank with one company, extending the other widely on his right to cut off the enemy’s retreat to the east or north-east. At 8.40 a.m. he reached a hummock, on ascending which his company was fired on by a party of the enemy 120 yards away. His men lay down and returned the fire. Five minutes later some fifty Turks jumped up from their trench, holding their rifles butt uppermost, while one who looked like an officer waved something white. Captain Cochran advanced owards them, signalling to them with his hand to come
over. A few unarmed Turks responded, then firing broke out again and several Sepoys fell.

Major T. N. Howard, brigade-major of the 22nd Indian Brigade, who had been watching from the west bank, saw that the number of the Turks was considerable and that they were strongly entrenched. He galloped back to Serapeum, whence Br.-General. Geoghegan despatched a company from each of the 27th and 62nd Punjabis and 128th Pioneers, under the command of Major Maclachlan, to Captain Cochran’s assistance. A fire fight of about an hour followed, but, just as the British detachment was about to charge, the enemy surrendered. Six officers and 292 men, of whom 52 were seriously wounded, were captured, with three machine guns. The dead found in the position numbered 59, among them being the German staff officer who had supervised the crossing, Hauptmann von dem Hagen [see below].

Opposite Ismailia and Qantara it was found that the enemy’s trenches were deserted. At noon Br.-General W.A.
Watson, commanding the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, with his own brigade, two infantry battalions and an Indian mountain battery, moved out from Ismailia Ferry Post. Seven miles north-east of Tussum a body of the enemy, estimated at three or four regiments, was seen. There was no sign of a general retreat, though further north a body of infantry was observed moving eastwards. The reconnaissance returned to the bridgehead after taking 25 prisoners and 70 camels, part of the Turkish water column.

On the morning of the aerial reconnaissance discovered that the enemy opposite the 2nd Sector
was concentrated east of Bir Habeita in his old camp, upon which bombs were dropped. This force was subsequently seen to deploy and advance some distance as if about to renew the attack, but it passed out of sight into a valley and did not again emerge. To the north the enemy’s right column was seen withdrawing through Qatiya, on the Mediterranean route. To the south a small detachment of New Zealand Infantry, the 2/7th Gurkhas, a squadron of Imperial Service Cavalry, and a battery of East Lancashire Artillery, encountered 7 miles north-east of Esh Shatt a body of about 100 Turks, which fell back at its approach.

On the 6th February mounted patrols from Qantara found Ed Dueidar evacuated by the Turks but were fired on by Bedouin. A camp of about a regiment was located at Rigum, east of the Great Bitter Lake, and another south-east of it at Moiya Harab. By the 10th February the only enemy reported in the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal was a body of 400 at Rigum.

No [British] counter-offensive, it will be seen, was launched on the morning of the 4th February, when it was discovered that the enemy had fallen back from the neighbourhood of the Canal. The opportunity for the destruction of the Turkish central force unfortunately could not be taken. [A result of too few mounted troops, too few trained men, units too far away, etc].

Casualties

The records of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission commemorate 38 dead in Egypt in the period 3-5 February 1915. I believe this includes three Australians who died of illness rather than action.

The German Major Wilhelm Karl von dem Hagen is among them, being buried at Ismailia War Memorial Cemetery.

AWM caption, “The grave of a German officer, Major Wilhelm Karl von dem Hagen, near the Suez Canal, Egypt, who died 3 February 1915. The cross is made from a wooden oar taken from a Turkish pontoon. Possibly to deter vandals, British or Australian soldiers have heavily encircled the grave site with barbed wire which has been secured and supported by stakes and star pickets. Major von dem Hagen led a contingent during the abortive Turkish attack across the Sinai Desert to the Canal in February 1915. His body was amongst those found by a British patrol two days after the fighting had ceased.”
  • Heliopolis (Port Tewfik) Memorial
    • 1/89th Punjabis
      • Sepoy 940 Baghirath Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 1232 Hakim Singh, 3 february 1915
      • Sepoy 2217 Bachan Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 2461 Bhagwan Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 2583 Sucha Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 2607 Bachan Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 8514 Harnam Singh, 5 February 1915
    • 1/2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajput Light Infantry
      • Havildar 1487 Nandlal Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepot 1583 Hari Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 1704 Chambela Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 2404 Dost Muhammed, 3 February 1915
    • 1/62nd Punjabis
      • Naik 279 Safdar Ali, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 781 Piru Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 1518 Tula Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 1800 Gujjar Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Havildar 207 Ali Akbar, 4 February 1915
      • Sepoy 1682 Sher Zaman, 4 February 1915
    • 1/92nd Punjabis
      • Sepoy A/47 Gul Shah, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 2441 Niamat Khan, 3 February 1915
      • Lance Naik 2560 Muhammad Zaman, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 2835 Indar Singh, 3 February 1915, attached from 93rd Burma Infantry
    • 2/10th Gurkha Rifles
      • Rfmn 805 Joglal Rai, 3 February 1915
    • 1/128th Indian Pioneers
      • Sepoy 3985 Teja Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Sepoy 4857 Nanak Singh, 3 February 1915
      • Lance Naik 4862 Uttam Singh, 3 February 1915
    • Hyderabad Lancers
      • Sowar 837 Muinuddin Khan, 5 February 1915
  • Ismailia War Memorial Cemetery
    • Royal Navy
      • Chief Yeoman of Signals 180636 Samuel John Smith, HMS Swiftsure, 4 February 1915
      • Ordinary Seaman J/19854 Austin William Christian, HMS Hardinge, 5 February 1915
    • 1/92nd Punjabis
      • Captain Lionel Francis Abingdon Cochran, 4 February 1915, attached from 72nd Punjabis
    • 1/2nd Queen Victoria’s Own Rajput Light Infantry
      • Captain Reinford Tatton Arundell, 3 February 1915
    • 128th Indian Pioneers
      • Lieutenant Richard Apjohn Fitzgibbon, 4 February 1915*
    • 1/1st East Lancashire Field Company, Royal Engineers (Territorial Force)
      • Sapper 1102 William Mottram, 3 February 1915
    • New Zealand Expeditionary Force
      • Private 6/246 William Arthur Ham, Canterbury Regiment, 5 February 1915.

*Lieutenant Fitzgibbon’s father was serving at the time as the Brigade Musketry Officer to 47th Infantry Brigade of the 16th (Irish) Division, in training in Ireland. Fitzgibbon was a graduate of Christ Church, Oxford and had been a cox of a rowing team at Henley regatta.

Links

General John Maxwell’s first despatch from Egypt includes greater detail concerning this action

General John Maxwell’s second despatch from Egypt covers the period from the attack to mid-1915

The relevant volume of the British Official History of Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine is available online as downloadable PDF. Volume I (to June 1917)

The war diaries of British and Indian units engaged in Egypt are available to view at the National Archives at Kew, London They have not been digitsed.

The war diaries of Australian and New Zealand units have been digitised and can be viewed and downloaded at the Australian War Memorial website

The campaign in Egypt and Palestine