I am very pleased to present this excellent article, written by Michael M. Morrison and Ian Hamilton. Michael most kindly offered it for display via The Long, Long Trail. I have just added some headings for ease of reading.
Introduction
A small but successful and effective British artillery unit which fought at Gallipoli is often only mentioned briefly and sometimes altogether missed in the many histories of that endeavour. That unit is the 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade, Royal Garrison Artillery (TF) and its component Batteries. Why should that be?
Existing literature about the Brigade and its batteries consists of a small pamphlet written by RSM James McKenzie, originally of the Argyll Mountain Battery, which was printed by “The Campbeltown Courier” in Argyll, Scotland in 1936, and a much larger and more recent, privately published three volume history [1] of the Ross & Cromarty Mountain Battery, one of the other two batteries of the Brigade. Existing War Diaries for the Gallipoli period are incomplete and to add insult to injury, those that are traceable have been periodically mislaid in the National Archives. Diaries of the Headquarters and the Ross & Cromarty Mountain Batteries were mistakenly
labeled “4th Highland Mounted Brigade” and filed within the 29th Divisional Artillery War Diaries. Where the Argyll Mountain Battery’s diaries are for this period is not known [2].
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The 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade, albeit at two-thirds strength, was the only mountain artillery assigned to the 29th Division (which was formed in January 1915 of the last ‘regular’ infantry battalions left in the British Army still unassigned to a division). It was also the only Territorial Force Artillery assigned to 29 Division. The Brigade’s assignment to the “Incomparable 29th” was only for five months, albeit five very important months in that famous Division’s history, before being reassigned to other Divisions and other arenas of combat. As I have learned of their exploits it has become clear to me that it is indeed regrettable that there is so little written on this very effective artillery Brigade or its component Batteries and their Gallipoli connection.
The Mountain Batteries were effective at Gallipoli largely because of their weaponry and tactics. Unlike conventional artillery of the time – the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) and Royal Field Artillery (RFA), which mounted their usually much larger cannons on fixed wheeled caissons pulled by teams of horses – our mountain gunners disassembled their “screw guns” (as Kipling called them in his famous poem, Screw Guns) and loaded them onto the backs of stout Highland Ponies, taking them into areas simply not attainable by the RHA & RFA. The small, rugged Highland Pony, bred for service on the crofts of the Scottish mountains and moorlands, was just right for carrying the mountain guns, their ammunition and equipment into the hills to provide fire support to the infantry. (It would seem however that the Ammunition Columns preferred mules and that is the animal they took with them.) This was the preferred method for the employment of mountain guns. If need be, and as was the case at times at Gallipoli, the gun teams had to be able to man-handle their guns and ammunition up to areas inaccessible even to their ponies and assemble them there to provide very effective fire. What was also discovered quickly in Gallipoli was that these guns, being positioned right up with the front line of infantry, could provide most effective anti-machine gun fires as well as shrapnel fired point blank into the ranks of charging enemy infantry. Their proximity to the target virtually eliminated them as the source of friendly fire incidents as well. They were very mobile and versatile in this hilly country and thus, provided very close
support for the infantry. The problem was that there just weren’t enough of them. The 4th Highland
(Mountain) Brigade was active across the southern front, while the 7th Indian Army Mountain Brigade provided their fires in the hills of ANZAC country to the north. The French had eight mountain guns in their sector to the east.
The normal complement of an artillery brigade was four batteries but the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade only had three – the Ross and Cromarty Mountain Battery (from Lochcarron and Stornoway and usually just called the Ross Battery), the Argyll Mountain Battery (from Campbeltown and Oban) and the Bute Mountain Battery (from Rothesay and Largs). A part of the Territorial Force, these batteries were the only Mountain Batteries in the British Army based in the UK. Each Battery had two sections of two guns each which sections tended to be
recruited in sometimes widely separated localities. The Brigade was headquartered at Rothesay on the Isle of Bute. Upon mobilization in August 1914, these three batteries with the Brigade HQ and the Brigade Ammunition Column (recruited in Tarbert Loch Fyne, Millport and Dingwall), concentrated in Inverness, then traveled to and trained at Bedford with the 51st (Highland) Division until March 1915.
Move to Gallipoli
On 10 March 1915, 2/3 of the 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade (the Ross and the Argyll batteries, Brigade HQ and BAC Sections) with its newly assigned Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Wynter, DSO, a Regular Army officer with Indian Army Mountain gun experience, bade farewell to the Bute Mountain Battery [3], those too old and too young for deployment and the good townspeople of Bedford with whom a fond attachment had grown, and made for Avonmouth. There they joined 29th Division and the great armada of ships heading for the eastern Mediterranean.
Upon embarkation, the 29th Divisional Artillery, in addition to the Headquarters and Ammunition Columns, consisted of the following units:
15th Bde, RHA (18 pr. QF) (B, L & Y Batteries)
17th Bde, RFA (18 pr. QF), (13th, 26th & 92nd Batteries)
147th Bde, RFA (18 pr. QF), (10th, 97th & 368th Batteries)
460th Howitzer Battery, RFA
90th Heavy Battery, RGA (60 pr. Guns)
14th Siege Battery, RGA (6” Howitzers),
1/4th Highland Mountain Brigade, RGA (TF) (10 pr. Mountain Guns), (Argyll Mountain Battery, Ross & Cromarty Mountain Battery).[4]
(All the above were Regular Army except 1/4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade.)
After a sometimes eventful voyage during which the two Batteries, their Ammunition Columns and their animals traveled in different ships at slightly different times, the Brigade arrived in Alexandria. The voyage was a hard one for the animals, being packed into the holds of the ships. They required constant care throughout the voyage. Once in Alexandria, they paraded with the 29th Division for the first time and, after about a week of a serenditipitous unplanned period of acclimatization, they packed their equipment and animals on different vessels bound for Gallipoli, sailing first on 9 April for Lemnos and the great harbour of Mudros. While in the harbour, the mountain gunners trained on disembarking themselves, their animals and equipment over the side of their ships on nets and at least one opportunity arose to practice occupying the surrounding hilltops. The gunners felt that far too much of the time was spent sweltering in their troop ships awaiting sailing orders. They also had one practice disembarking their ponies. That helped their animals get over the terrifying fear of being pulled out of the hold of one ship and slung over water to another before being placed on landing barges. Although they didn’t know it at the time, the inclusion of the animals of the 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade would prove critical to the landing forces on 25 April and for several days thereafter, another rarely told story of the 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade and its Batteries.
The Landing
On the morning of the 25 April, one two-gun section from each of the two batteries with their guns, ammunition and animals were detailed to embark behind the men of the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers on HMS Euryalus for Cape Helles – “W” Beach, their inclusion as first guns to be landed a recent change to the 29th Division plans. These sections prepared to follow the Fusiliers onto “W” Beach at Cape Helles. The plan called for them to land their guns around 8:00 am, but the plan hadn’t counted on severe obstacles amidst immediate steep terrain, mines, barbed wire and ferocious machine gun and rifle fire. Many of the Lancashire Fusiliers were
killed before they even reached the beach; in their boats, in the water and, for many of those who made it, on the beach itself. The extraordinarily professional and heroic actions of the Lancashire Fusiliers in securing that beachhead earned them six Victoria Crosses (before breakfast, it was said) and eventually secured this narrow
beach on the peninsula for follow-on troops, including the first artillery to land, our 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade gunners. The 1st Battalion of Lancashire Fusiliers suffered 55% casualties in the landing.
The official records are, understandably, more concerned with the Infantry and state very little about our mountain gunners (and what’s there is none too accurate) but personal diaries, letters and War Diaries show that the first battery sections may have landed around noon on that first day (though some eye-witness accounts give a rather earlier landing) and that they were in continuous action from that afternoon or evening until they were withdrawn just days before the August Suvla Bay landings. The action on the Gallipoli peninsula was arduous and losses were severe. The first section ashore was the right section of the Ross Battery and it was sent as soon as possible to take up a position to the right of the beach-head beyond the cliffs. The
Argyll section did not land for some hours later and when it did it was first of all retained on the beach-head to assist in sorting out the general chaos. As the two battery sections were carrying out their duties ashore, Lieutenant Colonel Wynter was informed by a 29th Divisional Staff Officer that the Artillery officer assigned to command Artillery Group III of the 29th Divisional Artillery had been killed, and that he was to assume that command in addition to his own. Artillery Group III at that time consisted of seven batteries of artillery in the southern sector, only two of which had yet landed. The situation on the beach was so desperate and confused that the first officers to land, Major Bryce Allan (later injured and evacuated) and Lieutenant Alexander D. Morrison (later killed in action) of the Ross Battery, had difficulty finding the troops they were to support and where to go. That was remedied soon and the guns were loaded up onto the Highland Ponies and moved to positions just up the very cliffs and hills so recently and dearly gained. The Argyll and the Ross sections already landed were ordered off to the right (or east) of the newly acquired front to a position 100 yards northeast of the Cape Helles Lighthouse, with the Ross Battery men supporting the 1st Battalion, Essex Regiment.
The batteries fired in support of operations in this sector until 28 April, when the Ross Battery was ordered to assist the French on the extreme right of the line as they arrived. The other sections of the Batteries were, along with the Ammunition Columns landed in dribs and drabs over the next few days but were immediately
employed in bringing order to the beaches before being deployed in action. In the meantime, back on W beach, the pace of the landings had slowed considerably from what was planned. Initially, there was no reserve infantry nor were there support troops or horses to move the supplies of ammunition and water just landed
to the beleaguered infantry fighting at that time nearby. The already landed Argyll and Ross Sections had taken their reliable Highland Ponies with them and these now assumed two critical missions. The Argyll gunners moved their guns to the vicinity of the Old Lighthouse to get in action as quickly as possible. The Ross gunners were already there. While the gun teams went into action, the Drivers, organized by Major Allan, used the ponies already landed to haul critical small arms ammunition and water to the infantrymen desperately struggling to hold onto and expand their precarious positions and push inland. Initially, they were the only transport available for this critical task. The Brigade members ashore performed both missions well until sufficient support troops and animals were landed to take over their hastily (and unhesitatingly) assumed duties. By 29 April, they had all rejoined their batteries. The only record, other than the knowledge passed down through the generations from the gunners themselves, of the first artillery round to be fired by British or
French Artillery was in a letter to Sergeant Mathieson of the Bute Battery and printed in The Buteman and West Coast Chronicle of 16 July. It is from Sergeant Ernie West of the Ross & Cromarty Mountain Battery who had been the Instructor of the Bute Mountain Battery before the war and attributes “first round down range”
to Gun #2 of the Ross Battery sometime in the afternoon of 25th April from their position near the ruined lighthouse. Bombardier Nelson, slated to win the DCM on 9th August and wounded on 15 August in the hills surrounding Suvla Bay, was the man who pulled the lanyard. Gunner D.J. Macdonald said that he had kept the shell case, but its whereabouts now are unknown.
The British forces on the point showed remarkable professionalism and courage as they rallied behind each succession of leaders. When the officers commanding a particular unit were killed, the resulting successions of command proceeded smoothly and quickly. In spite of the shock and losses of the landings, the damaged
and depleted forces unified a solid front after capturing the strong points of Hills 114, 138, Guezji Baba, a hill that was not on the maps available before the landing but which had to be taken, and Hill 141. By nightfall on 25 April, the only artillery ashore was the two half-batteries of the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade and 26
Battery, 17th Brigade RFA, an 18 pounder QF Battery. Contemporary 1st Essex maps of the situation show “two mountain guns” just behind their lines on Hill 138, which corresponds with other accounts and would make them Ross Battery guns.
After a cold and restless night, the mountain gunners awoke at daybreak on 26 April
to observe that two feet of ground fog had appeared overnight. BSM James H. McKenzie of the Argyll Mountain Battery described the eerie sight: “The sight was weird; the top half of a regiment of men walked in front, their
lower limbs buried in the fog. Gradually this disappeared and we could see the earth again.”5
They also saw the evidence of a fierce battle as the dead and wounded lay scattered about them from the action of the previous 24 hours. The Argyll Battery section moved to and occupied “Hill 141”, just above the village of Sedd-al-Bahr, and fired 1,264 rounds until the enemy had retreated out of range. They then moved to their right (east) where they had an opportunity to explore the old Turkish Fort at Sedd-al-Bahr before receiving orders to move again to their left about two miles (this done at night by moonlight). The Ross Battery Section had established a position above “X” Beach. They arrived before midnight and found places to sleep in the brush after digging in their guns. The remainder of the batteries arrived on 28 April, disembarking at ‘W’ Beach at 1800 hours. They located and rejoined their batteries and by 2200 hours they were already heavily engaged.
Subsequently, the battlefront moved northwards and began to stabilize as reinforcements arrived in greater numbers. Attempts to take the key village of Krithia had fizzled out after promising starts and missed opportunities and the prize of Achi Baba was no closer to being in Allied hands. The lines had been drawn and
trench warfare had begun. What had turned the Western Front into the deadly, stalemated battleground it had become was happening here. The Allies tried to exploit their gains in the first weeks after the initial invasion. They first forced the Turks back from the beaches, then through a succession of defensive lines toward
that elusive goal, Achi Baba. The First Battle of Krithia occurred right away, commencing on 28 April.
Elements of the 86th Infantry Brigade had reached the village early that morning. Unsupported, they were cut to pieces and forced to retire. Both the Argyll and the Ross Batteries were alerted at breakfast and commenced a twelve hour mission primarily fighting off the Turks’ inevitable counterattack. The gunners were forced to move their guns and supplies many times in the next twelve hours in order to put their bite into the battle. Ammunition had always been somewhat scarce and efficient use of what they had was the order of the day again. Some Infantry units simply ran out of ammunition.
Those manning the guns had a bad time with snipers, some of whom slipped up very close for their shots, and some of whom stayed behind and hid when the Turks retreated. They were also always sought out by Turkish artillery as targets whenever they could be located (which meant whenever they fired or moved, which was
constantly). The men of the Ammunition Column faced these hazards when with the guns and when traveling back and forth from the supply depots at the beaches to the distant gun lines. Indeed, the first Brigade casualties were from this group. After moving back and forth along the line and the Ross Battery’s brief stint
supporting the French, our gunners settled into “Gully Ravine”, their home and base of operations for the next three months. One account puts one battery 300 yards from the beach on the “left” side of the gully. The Ross Battery was on one side of the ravine and the Argyll Battery was on the other. The Brigade HQ set up shop at
‘Pink Farm’ and would remain there until the evacuation, even after the batteries were transferred out of the 29th Division and sent to Suvla Bay for operations there. Gully Ravine zigzagged its way northeast up country from Gully Beach on the west toward the prize of the expedition, Achi Baba. The ravine was primarily sandstone with almost perpendicular cliffs, some even undercut, into which roads were made (and named) on which to navigate, and holes were cut by the men to live in. The heights are listed on maps as from 150 to 200 feet above sea level. The front line cut the ravine in two – the southernmost part being in the hands of the Allies and the Turks controlling the northernmost. BSM Mackenzie described the layout: “So we solved our housing problems, cut winding paths to the top rows, where senior N.C.O.’s lived on ‘High Askomil’ or ‘Drumore’… a little path leading to a Cemetery was appropriately named ‘Kilkerran Road.’ At the
Horse Lines, a mile behind, our drivers lived in the same pre-historic manner.”6
They named these areas after places from home, just as the rest of the forces were to do with their trenches. The necessity to provide enfilading fire – the only Army or Navy artillery that was able to do so, occasionally required the gunners to hand carry their guns up onto precipitous cliffs to fire down on the enemy who were making good use of the folds in the terrain for cover. The Mountain Gunners began to lose men, ponies and guns. The gun crews were rotated through this duty. Each time the Turks realized that our Highland Gunners were present (by their proximity, the distinctive sound of the mountain guns and the effective fires of these close range cannons) they called in all the artillery salvoes (called counter-battery fires) they could to attempt to silence them. This was a deadly tribute to the effectiveness of the mountain gunners, but it also sped up the process of attenuation of the crews whose numbers were decreased by wounds, sickness and death. The crewmen nevertheless continued with their missions, enduring losses of cannons and animals as well. Many of the men who walked away from these counter-battery fires wondered how they did so. Many did not walk away.
In a letter home, Lieutenant William Hogarth, MC, described it like this, “Our guns were playing such havoc yesterday that we were shelled with 60 pounders and high explosive 18 pounders!! The place was perfect hell for about a quarter of an hour. They scored a direct hit on a shield above one of the guns and I suppose counted us out, but we lost neither men, guns nor ammunition.”7
In a good description of what firing missions were like for our gunners at Gallipoli, Gunner David M. Cunningham, Argyll Mountain Battery wrote a letter to his mother of the battle on 12th July, “There are five gunners on at a time while in action, and we had fired off about 100 shells, and stopped for a ‘breather’. All this time we were getting by the enemy’s percussion and shrapnel. We started firing again, but all at once our gun-pit parapet was blown up and all of us buried in amongst the sand bags and earth. When we had extricated ourselves, it was found that the only serious damage was one man wounded. Three times our gun pit pparapet was blown away in this manner, the Turks having evidently got our range. Altogether that day (the 12th {July}) we had four men killed (Cpl. Johnson, Bdr. McLean, Gunner McGowan and Gunner Robertson) and six
wounded. On the 13th we had this state of recurrent upheaval even worse, but I am glad to state that there were no casualties. One of officers, who was along with some of the General Staff officers, told me today that they had been watching us through field-glasses, and every time they saw our gun getting smothered in smoke and earth when a shell landed they thought it was a final. After all had quietened down our field telephone was rung up, and the general commanding the artillery enquired from our observing officer the names of the gunners. However, it is my opinion that nothing will come of it, as there are too many of us. It is quite satisfactory to know that a fellow has done his duty, and I am certain every man of the 29th
Division has done his.”
The batteries, sometimes in two gun sections and sometimes as lone guns, were rushed back and forth across the front for mission after mission. There was no day when the guns were not in action until they were withdrawn from the Helles front to prepare for the landings at Suvla Bay on the night of 3-4 August. Although there was no place on the peninsula where anyone was safe to rest peacefully, other units were allowed “down time” at the “rear” (even though the “rear” was not too far rear and was always within range of enemy shells and snipers). This at least allowed them to remove to the beaches for a swim (the only bathing available) and gave them time to repair clothing and equipment, relax with their comrades-in-arms away from the persistent snipers and the threat of charging attacks. Although small groups went down to the beach and the losses alone caused gun crews to be reformed repeatedly, the effect of the little mountain guns was so vital that they were in constant demand.
In the beginning, the Brigade consisted of eight mountain guns and crews. This was not nearly enough to provide the support needed by the infantry along the Helles line. While naval gunfire and the fire of the guns and howitzers of the RFA/RHA was impressive and effective when enemy troops were caught in the open, the Turks continued their tactic of evacuating their trenches when bombarded, until the shelling stopped, after which they re-occupied their trenches to defend against the inevitable attack. They also learned that these impressive pieces of artillery could not enfilade, or fire down into their forward positions, so they could use the terrain as a shield. The mountain guns, when properly positioned, could and did enfilade even these safe havens. As artillery, even our mountain gunners, often shoot at targets beyond visual range, they require a small crew to be forward of their positions with the supported infantry to tell them where and what their targets are as well as to advise on adjustment of fire. These “eyes of the artillery” were provided by the Forward Observing Officer (the F.O.O.), a battery officer, and his party of signalers. These parties went forward
with the infantry and established communications with the battery through telephones upon wires laid as they moved forward. When the telephone lines were cut or unavailable, the signalers resorted to semaphore and visual signals. This was a particularly hazardous duty. The Infantry was usually too involved with its own mission to look out for the FOO party so they acted fairly independently. Their mission was to stay with the Infantry and provide fire support as and when needed, by relaying data to the gun lines. Lieutenant Hogarth described this duty: “My job was to keep in touch with the infantry to let the battery know when the infantry needed support and where. So my two telephonists and I got the wire shifted forward about 600-700 yards and established a fresh point.”8
Death, sickness, injury, wounds and the loss of cannons through wear and tear and enemy action exacted their toll on our mountain gunners and by June 1915, the Argyll and the Ross Batteries had dwindled to one amalgamated battery, known in some histories as The Highland Mountain Battery. That Highland Battery had,
however, but a temporary existence. All the internal battery appointments for both the Argyll and the Ross Batteries continued as before so there were in the Highland battery two BSMs and indeed two of every other rank – so that when numbers built up again through reinforcement it was possible to split the two component parts into their individual identities at a stroke and without a single hiccup. The guns themselves, however, were so worn out that when they were sent to the Royal Navy ordnance shop that was assigned the task of repair they were deemed un-repairable and relegated to the scrap pile.
A snapshot of the effect of the Gallipoli operations on the 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade, even before the Suvla Bay landings, is contained in the Military Cross citation to Captain A.E.C. Burney, a man who was the Ross Mountain Battery Adjutant until the amalgamation and creation of the Highland Mountain Battery,
when he was pressed into action as the Commander of the “Highland Mountain Battery”. “Burney, A. E. C., Adjt. 1/4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade, RGA, (T.F.). Gallipoli, 1915. This officer was in command of the Highland
Mountain Battery (organized from the Ross and Argyll Mountain Batteries) in the Gallipoli Operations. He was indefatigable in recconnoitring {sic} forward positions for his guns, close to the front line trenches, placing his guns in them and superintending their fire. It is due to his initiative, resource and personal example that this Territorial battery has done such excellent work. During the first two months this battery had 3 officers killed and 5 wounded, and 54 N.C.O.’s and men killed and wounded. It never had a day’s rest and yet its morale remained as good as ever, greatly due to Captain Burney’s example. (M.C. 8/11/15, Mentioned
in Despatches 5/11/15)” 9
Combat losses were high. In May 1915 there were at least six deaths recorded in the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade. Bombardier Alexander A. Mackenzie of the Ross Battery died on the 2nd during a massive Turkish attack. Gunner Alan McKeith of the Argyll Mountain Battery was wounded on 8th May, during the Second Battle of Krithia, “struck by a stray bullet from the Turkish Trenches and died soon afterwards” on 9th of May. Also on the 8th of May, Gunner MacLean of the Ross Battery was found to be missing and presumed dead. On the 11th, Driver Donald Mackenzie of the Ross Battery perished, and on the 26th, Driver John Macrae of the
Ross Battery died.10. Gunner as Driver Kenneth Macdonald died of wounds while on a hospital ship 15 May 1915.
Referring to the Second Battle of Krithia, the history of the Royal Regiment of Artillery says, “There can be few battles in history which began with such an impossible task, with so little artillery and men so worn out by continuous fighting.”11 At the end of this battle, there was no artillery ammunition left in reserve on the beaches for the Batteries and only 1400 rounds afloat nearby on board supporting ships. Although ammunition supply was always a problem, this shows how much firing was done in this battle, which gained Allied forces 400 yards, but not the objective, the town of Krithia. In addition to the six deaths, there were at least nineteen wounded in May. June was costly as well. In the course of The Third Battle of Krithia, 4 June 1915, and the
Battle of Gully Ravine, which commenced 28 June 1915, there were at least 19 wounded and 9 deaths. On 2 June Gunner and Piper John MacDonald, who had been wounded on either the 15th or the 25th May, succumbed to his wounds on a hospital ship and was buried at sea, the 4th Ross Battery man to die. On 4 June Major Thomas MacKelvie, Commander of Argyll Battery, was wounded for the first time, but would rejoin his unit on the 28th. On 5 June Gunner Murdo Mackenzie, 19, died of wounds received earlier. On the 9th, Acting Bombardier John Brown of the Ammunition Column died of disease. On 12th Corporal Charles Sheddan’s gun was in a firing position being screened with sandbags when he was shot through the heart by a sniper and died. On 14th Gunner John Brown died of disease after having been shipped to Alexandria for treatment. Both John Browns (see 9th June) were assigned to the Ammunition Section.
Gully Ravine
The Battle of Gully Ravine, commencing 28 June, was an effort to deprive the Turks of their coastline trenches and consolidate earlier gains prior to pushing on to the elusive Achi Baba. This would be another battle that relied on inadequate supplies of artillery ammunition and inaccurate maps. It was costly to many units, including our Highland Mountain Brigade, now reduced operationally to The Highland Mountain Battery. The trenches were taken and the Turks, in spite of heavy attacks to retake them, were not to see this ground again until the Allies gave it up in January 1916. On the 28th Gunner George Andrew Cuthbertson. Second Lieutenant Murdo John Mackenzie, commissioned from Sergeant in the Ross Mountain Battery just eight months earlier, was killed when he received Shrapnel wounds to the head while setting up a gun position. On 29 June – Gunner John Hamilton of Campbeltown was “killed by a bullet while doing his duty at the gun.” (as described by Sergeant A Johnston in a letter to the Campbeltown Courier.) In a sad bit of irony, he had written a letter home to his father, John Hamilton of Campbeltown that day, but his father received the letter only after he had received word, by a letter from Gunner Hamilton’s brother soldiers, that his son was killed in action.
Captain William Todd, a Battery Officer of the Argyll Battery, was also killed that day. Captain Todd was reconnoitering a position for the left gun when his foot was blown off by a shell burst. Two Sappers of the 1st West Riding Field Company of the Royal Engineers, Sappers A. Jennett and G. Packard, received the Distinguished Conduct Medal on that occasion for rescuing Captain Todd from the battlefield from an exposed position under heavy fire, crossing over a wire entanglement to do so. Although he was rescued from the battlefield, he failed to survive his wound, succumbing the next day. In a letter to The Buteman and West Coast Chronicle, Gunner A. Tweedly quoted a letter from General Simpson-Baikie, CRA, 29th Division, to Captain Burney dated 30 June 1915, “I am just sending these few lines to tell you how sorry I was to hear of the
losses sustained by your battery in yesterday’s action. I am particularly sorry to hear of the death of Lieutenant Mackenzie and of Captain Todd’s very bad wound. We all realize that your battery is always up in the front
trenches and in the very thick of the fighting and I assure you that the very hard work of your officers and men is much appreciated and we regulars are proud to have such gallant fellows as yours fighting alongside with us.” Gunner Tweedly added that Captain Todd had since died of his wounds. “We all felt sorry at losing such fine officers. They were both heroes and were good to their men.” 12
The Ammunition Column was made up of both Royal Artillery “Gunners as Drivers” and Army Service Corps (ASC) Drivers. Their primary duty was to constantly and consistently supply the guns with ammunition from the ammunition dumps down by the beaches in addition to “lumping” food and water from the quartermaster stores,
also at the beaches. But they were also trained as gunners and were expected to fill in as such when the need arose. And that need did arise. When the gunners took casualties and the crew numbers dropped down to one gunner left manning a gun more than once, a deed that earned the Distinguished Conduct Medal for Bombardier J. L. Nelson on 9 August 1915 at Suvla Bay. The drivers were the only soldiers capable of assisting in the arduous and exact, deadly science of artillery. These men, although seasoned veterans in the thick of the fighting now, were still citizen soldiers – Territorials. Less than a year earlier they had been at their civilian
occupations and many were still at school. There was a telling moment in the spring which reminds us of ability of humanity to rise to the surface in the midst of the inhumanity of war.
Unbeknownst to anyone, one of the mares belonging to the Argyll Mountain Battery had been shipped in foal. That mare gave birth to a beautiful little foal on the peninsula which the men named “Lady Gallipoli”. Andrew Boyle, a Gunner transferred from the Bute Mountain Battery to the Argyll Mountain Battery for the Gallipoli operation, had worked at Acholter Farm on the Isle of Bute before the war and was dubbed the ‘godfather’ of “Lady Gallipoli”. Lady Gallipoli was a spring gift to our gunners; however she was a thorn in the side of the Brigade veterinarian (assigned to the Brigade from the Army Veterinary Corps), Lieutenant John W. Brownlees. While gunners were being relieved on the gun lines so they could go to the horse lines to see their new mascot, the order came to “dispose” of the foal. Forage and water were hard to find for the animals that were already there and those animals, all with a purpose and a duty were being “short rationed” to feed Lady Gallipoli and her mother. The men were in a quandary and the Sergeant in charge (Sergeant Donald Mackenzie of Campbeltown) was on the spot. Men were being imprisoned, even shot for refusing to obey a direct order. Sgt. Mackenzie was being threatened with court martial if he didn’t kill Lady Gallipoli from one side and with quite specific and frightening threats from the men if he did! Now what to do? Lady Gallipoli was to be spared, but in a tragic way. Lieut. Brownlees, on his way to the horse lines to see if his order had been carried out, was killed (at age 40) by shell-fire on 16 June 1915 and Lady Gallipoli was spared and survived the campaign. Gunner Robert Y. Johnston wrote a letter to the hometown newspaper in which he describes Gunner Boyle and Lady Gallipoli: “He {Gunner Boyle} lavishes the utmost kindness and care upon the mare and her foal and his attention is reciprocated by both. The youthful one will follow him anywhere. This foal was christened “Lady Gallipoli” by the boys and she will answer to “Lady” or “Polly” at any time. She has brought a ray of sunshine amongst us, and a child could not be better treated and nursed. But she is growing every day and the bigger she gets the greater will be the void between us.”[13]
A Touch of Home, A Brief Rest and Back to Battle
On 20 July Lieutenant Hogarth writes that he had received a set of bagpipes sent by his father. The many pipers of the Ross and the Argyll Batteries were forced to leave their pipes at home and they had missed them dearly. “Mothers and Father’s letters haven’t arrived yet, but Do’ (his sister) and the Ben Dhu one and the pipes did. Thank you ever so much for them. We had them going for a bit this morning. They were splendid and the men enjoyed it fine. Even some of Kitchie’s Englishmen [14] stopped for a bit and watched and listened! …Pipe Major McNeil has just finished another spell at the pipes and I went down and had a look at him, and he had quite a large and appreciative audience about him.”[15]
Imagine what the Turks thought when they heard the pipes!
Letters and parcels from home were a great source of strength to a soldier. There is frequent reference to these being received and our lads, being literate men and well brought up, acknowledged as many as they could. There are letters in The Campbeltown Courier from soldiers (at least one of whom was killed shortly thereafter) thanking the folks back home for gifts of socks, scarves, tobacco and sweets as well as news from home and kind thoughts. Family members came through with requested items (the bagpipes being a rather large request and magnanimous gift with far reaching effects) so that, even if Gallipoli and Salonika are referred to by some historians as “The Forgotten Front”, it and their soldiers were not forgotten in the minds of those back home, both family members and community members.
Finally, on the night of 3-4 August, the exhausted Highland Mountain Battery, minus the Brigade HQ, was evacuated from the Gallipoli peninsula to Imbros for they knew not what. There was some thought and many wishes (not to mention a few rampant rumors) that they were to be sent home. They were just glad to be able to sleep a night’s undisturbed sleep, eat a meal in peace and, occasionally, when fatigue duties were done and the animals, equipment and guns were cared for, take a peaceful walk on this beautiful Greek island. It seemed like a paradise to many and was, indeed, too good to last.
While resting and refitting on this island, the Navy “found” another set of 10-pounder mountain guns on board a ship which had been sent from India, ostensibly for the 7th Mountain Brigade at ANZAC, and issued them to the two reconstituted batteries, which also received another draft of men from the 2/4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade training program in the UK to replace their manpower losses.
A complaint expressed by General Sir Ian Hamilton prior to the initial landings (and ignored by his superiors in England), was that the Egyptian newspapers carried full coverage of troop movements and openly “speculated” on the intention of landing these troops at Gallipoli. He tried unsuccessfully to have this silenced, and felt strongly, with good cause, that this openness about the Gallipoli mission is one reason the peninsula was so strongly fortified. Therefore, the upcoming operation, a landing at Suvla Bay supporting an ANZAC breakout, was kept excessively secret. Troops on the ground were not to know where they were going or what the battle
plan was until the landing was taking place. This added to the innate problems of a night amphibious landing as, after a successful landing, the exploitation phase presented itself and faded, allowing the surprised Turks to rush reinforcements from other areas to occupy the heights that were the initial objectives of the Allies and
should have been captured and fortified quickly. That failure to promptly move onto high ground set the stage for some heart breaking attempts to take the now fortified and defended heights.
Suvla Bay
On 6 August, late at night, two skeleton Batteries chosen from the replenished but still worn out mountain gunners set out once again for the peninsula. The mission was, in conjunction with a north-eastward attack from the ANZAC troops at Gaba Tepe, to invade the new sector at Suvla and open up a front to cut off reinforcements and resupply to the enemy established on the peninsula. To quote from the History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, “Sir Ian Hamilton aimed to land 13,700 men of 11th Division and the 12 guns of 4th (Highland) Mountain Brigade (8 x 10 pounders) and “A” Battery (4 x 18 pounders) of 59th Brigade RFA starting at 2200 hours on 6th August and ending at 1000 hours on the 7th… Part of the role of the initial infantry
landings was to secure enough ground for the buildup of artillery. Brigadier S.C.U. Smith, BGRA 9th Corps (Brigadier General of Royal Artillery, the Artillery Commander for the 9th Corps) planned to support the landings by naval gunfire, to land 12 guns with the initial landings (4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade and A Btry 59th Bde) and to build these up to 56 by nightfall 7th August.”[16]
In reality, only one section from each battery landed at Suvla Bay (4 guns), the remainder being left behind on Imbros as a reserve. In any event, they landed and sent straight to work. The men, still wearing the uniforms, boots and kit they were wearing when they landed back in April, were the first guns ashore again. This August landing was different from the April landings in that complete surprise was achieved and they were able to land relatively unmolested. Unfortunately, it wasn’t just the enemy who were surprised. The effort to maintain secrecy about these landings was so successful that most of the troops, including officers and non-commissioned officers, did not know their missions upon landing. The resulting confusion, lethargy and loss
of the initiative are well documented. To add to the confusion, the Navy was landing in uncharted and unscouted waters with new vessels (the “Beetles” or armored landing craft with ramps in the front to land the troops). Consequently, many of these green troops were landed on beaches they were unprepared for and had to effect long road marches to get to their assigned sectors. There were many new troops in this landing and to these untried men of “Kitchener’s Army”, the mountain gunners were “old sweats.” The Mountain Gunners knew what to do and did it, initially taking up their positions according to plan; unaware that the infantry they were supposed to be supporting and that was supposed to be directly in front of them hadn’t made it to their starting positions. This was a moment when the mountain gunners were not at the front line, they were the front line. Unaware of the situation on the beaches, they had occupied their assigned positions and dug in their guns, ready to fire, until an agitated infantry officer charged up on his horse and informed them that they were a mile ahead of the front line. Once again, their skill and speed served them well as they loaded up their guns and led their ponies, quickly, back to the “real” lines. Fortunately they had, as usual, prepared good positions, because the battle plan was back on track shortly and the next day, they moved their guns and equipment right back into the same positions.[17]
This endeavour at Suvla, too, was doomed, although the sections from the Ross Battery and the Argyll Battery fought in what had become a typically efficient and effective manner. Here, as in the south, they suffered indescribable deprivation, were constantly in jeopardy of snipers bullets, artillery shells, or the new menace, aerial bombs, and suffered from extremes of heat and cold, rain and frost, shortages of food and water, and disease. In spite of all this from all reports they carried on well and didn’t let the situation ruin their morale or efficiency. One observation of their effectiveness was written in the diary of the 34th Brigade Commander, Brigadier-General Sitwell, describing one of those actions on 9 August in which the gunners moved to the south of the battle area (the area of Chocolate Hill) from the north to provide fires. “The Mountain Gun Battery had two guns put out of action very soon, but the other two supported me well particularly shelling Hill 70 with the
greatest accuracy whenever the Turks got on it, and assisted us splendidly when the scrub fire drove us back.”
And the next day, describing an action where the Turks were counter attacking. “I directed the fire of my mountain guns right across their front as I could see the enemy about two to three hundred yards in front of their trench. I saw many Turks running away as the result of this fire and hoped it would
materially assist an advance, but things seemed to be at a deadlock.”[18]
In response to calls for their services, our Mountain Gunners moved all over the area as the combat veterans they had become. Toward the end of this campaign, when the decision had been made to evacuate the peninsula starting with the troops at Suvla Bay, the guns were required to move to a new location, fire a few rounds, pack up, move to another position, fire a few rounds, etc., in an effort to fool the enemy into believing that there was more artillery on the ground than there actually was and that operations were continuing, not terminating.
There are several comments regarding the good morale of our Highland gunners. Because of their pre-war associations, they kept each other’s equilibrium in the face of the losses and hardships they faced. In one example from RSM Mackenzie’s work, a gunner, identified only as “Gunner E_____” (whom I feel was probably
Gunner A. Emery, #2466, wounded 10 May, 1915) “came in from one of the forward guns with blood running down his sleeve. He reported himself unfit for duty, but when his tunic was removed it was found that a bullet had just nipped the tip off his shoulder. A daub of iodine, a piece of lint held on with sticking plaster, and an order to go back to his gun was all the comfort he got from the S.M. (Sergeant Major). So we offered him a share of our bully beef stew and had just got seated round the Dixie when a Turkish shell burst above us and sprayed the ground with shrapnel bullets. Gunner E_____ rolled over in agony, a bullet through his thigh. We had all, a dozen of us, escaped death by inches, but we roared with laughter when E_____ groaned out—‘Will I get to the Hospital noo’ Sergeant Major?’ [19]
One reads throughout the letters and diary entries that still exist, the exhortation that there was “no need to be downhearted.”
Withdrawal
The difficult decision was eventually made by the Allied Command to withdraw all Allied troops from Gallipoli. This evacuation occurred in December 1915 and was, by all accounts, the most successful part of the whole Gallipoli campaign. The Turks were, apparently, completely surprised when they discovered that the Allies had left. (Or, just so fed up with their own losses, which were worse than the Allies, that they just wanted the Allies to leave. There is also some conjecture among historians that this was a gesture of respect for the fighting spirit and abilities of the British and French Soldiers, but officially – it was a surprise.) As usual, the mountain gunners
were tasked with providing fires for the last line of defence and were the last guns to leave Suvla Bay.
There is no shortage of irony in the fate of the two guns belonging to the Argyll (skeleton) Battery left with their crews to provide final protective fires for the evacuating party. When allowed to evacuate the position early in the morning, they were placed on a barge to be towed out to a waiting naval vessel. En route, the towing vessel executed a rather sharp turn and the guns slid off into the sea where they lie to this day. The Ross Battery boys claimed that they had been able to get their guns off the peninsula (old and expendable though these guns were) and accordingly had ‘stuck to their guns!’
When one sees infantry casualties that are so high, the casualty figures of the 4th Highland (Mountain) Brigade might seem small. While no casualties are to be slighted, the impact of their casualties has to be seen in light of their much smaller numbers and the fact that their casualties all came without once ‘going over the top’. As stated earlier, their casualties were so high that they had to amalgamate what was left into one composite battery, something no other artillery had to do, yet was an accommodation made by some infantry units due to their losses in this campaign.
For many decades surviving gunners, NCO’s and officers gathered together every 25th April in Stornoway, home of the Left Section, Ross Mountain Battery, to remember their fallen comrades and the Gallipoli Campaign. Their Commanding General, General Sir Ian Hamilton, came to dedicate the War Memorial in
Stornoway and paid tribute to them in this way, “The first time I set eyes on the splendid lads of the Ross Mountain Battery was at Bedford. The next time I met them was at Alexandria in April. After that I used to hear their guns by night and by day for as long as they had shell to fire, and like every other officer and man of the Helles Force, I drew courage and strength from the sound. A volume of praise could not say more for a battery than that they, so vulnerable to the sniper, carried their screw guns and ammunition on their own backs right into the front rank of the 29th Division – sometimes spoken of as the Incomparable Division and sometimes as the Immortal Division. The gunners fought their little screwguns from the front-line trenches, and the drivers took up work just as dangerous, bringing their ponies, laden with ammunition and water; time after time right into the infantry firing line. These lads were mostly students from your Nicholson Institute, the great educational centre of the Island of Lewis. Their guns were the first artillery ashore, both at Helles and at Suvla. That is a remarkable, a wonderful record, and that is one reason why I came here today to unveil this memorial. They were badly cut up, alas! At Suvla, no.2 gun’s crew was reduced to one man, who went on serving it until a couple of signalers ran up to lend him a hand. But once I begin to give instances there will be no end, and I have come to an end now. The story of the Ross Mountain Battery in the Great War is beautiful, so beautiful that you must be careful when you hand it down, lest you inspire the youth of the island with a cult for war. Tell them, then, from me that these lads who have fallen would be far more honoured were they permitted to be the last of their clan than if future generations were to endeavour to imitate them. Let them strive to bring it to pass that this memorial which I now unveil, may stand forever alone in its glory.” [20]
Author’s Note: We would like to thank Sheriff Colin Scott Mackenzie, author of The Last Warrior Band, for his comments and suggestions.
The Highland Gunners of the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade, RGA (TF) who died during the Gallipoli campaign
Alexander Angus Mackenzie, Bombardier #4319 Ross Mountain Battery. Died 2 May. The son of John Mackenzie, Stornoway. Bombardier Mackenzie was the first Lewis man killed from the Ross Battery. Remembered on Helles Memorial, he was known to his fellow gunners as “Sir Henry”.
Norman Maclean, Gunner #4335 Ross Mountain Battery. Died 8 May. He was a student and lived at 5 Vatisker, Lewis, before the war. He was noticed missing 8 May 1915 and was presumed dead. “Born in Back, Stornoway and enlisted in Stornoway, the son of Donald Maclean of Stornoway. He died in Alexandria, Egypt, on May 18, age 22 and is buried at the Chatby War Memorial Cemetery, Alexandria.” RMB
Alexander McKeith, Gunner as Driver #1304 or 2309 Argyll Mountain Battery. Died 8 or 9 May 1915 at Gallipoli, he transferred to the Argyll Mountain Battery from the Bute Battery in March 1915, Gunner McKeith was the 1st Bute Territorial killed, “taking a meal at an interval in the fighting, when he was struck by a stray bullet from the Turkish Trenches and died soon afterwards”. He was an apprentice plumber in Rothesay with Morrison Brothers Plumbing. The son of James McKeith of Rothesay, he is buried at Pink Farm Cemetery.
Donald Mackenzie, Gunner #4185 Ross Mountain Battery. Died of wounds 11 May (14 May per 29th Division Artillery War Record Book). He was born in Kintail, Ross-shire and enlisted in Carndhu, Dornie, Kyle of Lochalsh, and was the son of John and Margaret Mackenzie of Carriedubh, Dornie, Kyle of Lochalsh, Ross-shire. Another account said he was wounded on 25 May and died 28 May, but the Commonwealth War Graves Commission reports that he died on 14 May. To his fellow gunners, he was known as “Ghillie”.
Kenneth Macdonald, Gunner as Driver #4318 Ross Mountain Battery. Died 15 May of wounds while on a hospital ship aged 22. An engineer of 1 Mackenzie St., Stornoway, he was the son of Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Macdonald, of 17, Lower Sandwick, Stornoway. He is remembered on the Helles Memorial and was known as “Kenny Ulaidh”. (He was called Keith Macdonald in The Scotsman.)
John Macrae, Driver #4053 Ross Mountain Battery. Wounded 25 May (16 May according to CWGC & 29 DAWR) and died of wounds the following day aboard a hospital ship. A gardener from Kishorn, Lochcarron, he
was born at and enlisted in Lochcarron, the son of Isabella MacRae, of Kilnburn, Kishorn, Lochcarron, Ross-shire, and the late John MacRae. Remembered on Helles Memorial 16 May aged 22 years” (PGRGA) Helles Memorial, RMB.
John Macdonald, Gunner and Piper #4403 Ross Mountain Battery. Wounded 15 or 25 May, he subsequently died of his wounds on 2 June 1915 on a hospital ship aged 39. He was a clothier of 4 Plantation Rd., Stornoway and an original member of the Lewis Pipe Band. Born and enlisted in Stornoway and was
buried at sea (although The Scotsman listed his death as occurring at Alexandria in a hospital.) Remembered on Helles Memorial.
Murdo Mackenzie John, Gunner #4379 Ross Mountain Battery. Died wounds 5 June, age 19, he came from 51 Lower Garrabost, Stornoway the son of Kenneth and Annie Mackenzie. “Gunner Murdo Mackenzie, Ross Mountain Battery, has been killed at the Dardanelles. He was a son of Mr. Kenneth Mackenzie, 51 Lower Garrabost, Stornoway and was 19 years old. At the outbreak of hostilities he was a student in Nicholson Institute, Stornoway.” The Scotsman, 26 June 1915).
George Strachan, Gunner #4899 Ross Mountain Battery. The son of James Strachan of Norwich, Norfolk, Driver Strachan was born in Pangbourne, Berkshire, and attested in London. He died of wounds received on 6
June, age 27 years while at Gallipoli and buried Pink Farm Cemetery, Helles.
John Brown, Acting Bombardier #4166 Brigade Ammunition Column. Died from illness on 9 June 1915 at Gallipoli and buried at Lancashire Landing Cemetery. He was born in Wick, Caithness, and enlisted in Dingwall, Ross and Cromarty, he lived at Burnside Place, Dingwall.
Charles Sheddan, Corporal #145 Argyll Mountain Battery. Landed on 25 April, a member of Gun #2 of the Argyll Mountain Battery. Killed in action 5 June (12 Jun per CWGC, 29 DAWR and KIAG List) Corporal Sheddan was
in charge of a gun which had been advanced into a firing position, and was being screened with sandbags when he was shot through the heart by a sniper. Corporal Sheddan, aged 27 was the son of Mr. James Sheddan, cabinetmaker, Campbeltown, and leaves a widow and two children.