Infantry platoons in offensive action

The British Army underwent a radical development between 1914 and 1918. It adopted new organisation and command and control systems, and it integrated new types of weaponry ranging from aircraft to chemicals to tanks. Historians these days often refer to the “learning curve” of hard experience that drove these changes.

One of the key points of development was the introduction of new organisation, tactics and training for the platoon in an infantry battalion. It was expressed in the training document SS143 “Instructions for the training of platoons for offensive action, 1917“, which was issued by the General Staff in February 1917. The approach drew upon the lessons learned in the furnace of the Battle of the Somme in 1916. It related to SS135 “Instructions for the training of divisions for offensive action, 1917“, which defined the how the larger organisation would work.

Imperial War Museum photograph Q5970. Troops of the 13th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry preparing to advance on the village of Veldhoek, Battle of the Menin Road, near Ypres 20 September 1917.

What was a Platoon?

A Platoon was part of a Company, which in turn was part of a Battalion. See What was a Battalion?

It was the smallest unit that was armed with all of the various weapons provided to the infantry. The platoon, usually commanded by a Second Lieutenant, had a maximum strength of 44 other ranks and required a minimum of 28 to be able to operate.

Taking 36 other ranks as a typical average in practice, it would be organised as follows. In addition to their specialist weapons, each man would carry a rifle. When going into action, all except the Numbers 1 and 2 of the Lewis Gun team, and rifle bomb firers, would have a bayonet fitted to their rifle.

Platoon HQ: 1 officer and 4 other ranks;
Bombing (that is, hand grenade) Section: 1 NCO and 8 men (of which 2 would be bayonet men and 2 would be bomb throwers);
Lewis Gun Section: 1 NCO and 8 men;
Rifle Section: 1 NCO and 8 men (including picked shots, picked bayonet fighters and scouts);
Rifle Bomb (that is, rifle grenade) Section: 1 NCO and 8 men (including four bomb firers).

This represented a radical change. In 1914 to 1916, the platoon as essentially a rifle unit. It was only as armament and tactics developed piecemeal-fashion to adopt the hand grenade, rifle grenade and light machine gun (none of which existed in any meaningful form before the war) that numbers of men began to specialise. Now it would become the norm.

The new platoon tactics

All men, regardless of their specialist section, would be continue to be trained in the rifle and now also in the hand grenade. “Instructions for the training of platoons for offensive action, 1917” provided a detailed training itinerary for the officers, NCOs and men of the platoon.

A schematic of how platoons would be organised for an attack on an enemy trench. In such a situation, there was no open flank that the attack might work around and exploit, and there would almost always be other British units attacking on either side. Each platoon would organise itself as shown. The lead platoon would have its rifle and bombing sections in its first line, followed by the rifle grenade and Lewis machine gun sections, and behind them a number of men designated as “moppers up”: they would ensure that enemy were cleared out of trench dugouts and not able to rise to shoot the advancing British troops in the back. The support platoon would be similarly organised into lines and advance some 50 to 100 yards behind the lead platoon’s moppers-up.

Extending the same attack concept to all four Platoons making up a Company. Placing two platoons side by side on an attack frontage of 200 yards, in each wave.

Before the new approach was adopted, any attacking unit that met with a particular point of enemy resistance would tend to stop and take cover. This was especially so if the units on either side had failed to keep up with it, leaving its flanks “in the air”. It would wait until those units had closed up before trying to advance again, if it did so at all. It all slowed momentum and placed the attacking troops in a position of remaining under fire.

In the new method, the specialism of the platoon’s sections would come into play. On encountering a point of resistance (such as a pillbox or strongpoint), the rifle grenade and Lewis machine gun sections of the lead platoon would take cover and engage it, firing continually to kill the enemy or at least “keep their heads down”. Meanwhile, the rifle and bombing sections would continue to advance, probing around the flank of the point of resistance, ideally getting into the rear of it, to kill or capture its garrison. Once done and the strongpoint was neutralised, the platoon advance could continue. “*Instructions for the training of platoons for offensive action, 1917*” provides much more detail.

Increasingly, as the Germans shifted to adopt a “defence in depth” strategy, attacking British troops were not confronted with a continuous entrenched system but with a deep network of strongpoints. The situation more resembled open warfare and different tactics were called for, but essentially it also relied on firepower to engage the enemy while the riflemen and bombers worked their way around the open enemy flank.

Links

What was a Battalion